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ABSTRACT
Modeling and Control of Network Traffic for Performance and Secure
Communications. (December 2004)
Yong Xiong, B.S., Tsinghua University (China);
M.S., Chinese Academy of Space Technology (China)
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Jyh-Charn (Steve) Liu
The objective of this research is to develop innovative techniques for modeling
and control of network congestion. Most existing network controls have discontinuous
actions, but such discontinuity in control actions is commonly omitted in analytical
models, and instead continuous models were widely adopted in the literature. This
approximation works well under certain conditions, but it does cause significant dis-
crepancy in creating robust, responsive control solutions for congestion management.
In this dissertation, I investigated three major topics. I proposed a generic discontin-
uous congestion control model and its design methodology to guarantee asymptotic
stability and eliminate traffic oscillation, based on the sliding mode control (SMC)
theory. My scheme shows that discontinuity plays a crucial role in optimization of
the I-D based congestion control algorithms. When properly modeled, the simple I-D
control laws can be made highly robust to parameter and model uncertainties. I dis-
cussed applicability of this model to some existing flow or congestion control schemes,
e.g. XON/XOFF, rate and window based AIMD, RED, etc.
It can also be effectively applied to design of detection and defense of distributed
iv
denial of service (DDoS) attacks. DDoS management can be considered a special
case of the flow control problem. Based on my generic discontinuous congestion con-
trol model, I developed a backward-propagation feedback control strategy for DDoS
detection and defense. It not only prevents DDoS attacks but also provides smooth
traffic and bounded queue size.
Another application of the congestion control algorithms is design of private
group communication networks. I proposed a new technique for protection of group
communications by concealment of sender-recipient pairs. The basic approach is
to fragment and disperse encrypted messages into packets to be transported along
different paths, so that the adversary cannot efficiently determine the source/recipient
of a message without correct ordering of all packets. Packet flows among nodes are
made balanced, to eliminate traffic patterns related to group activities. I proposed
a sliding window-based flow control scheme to control transmission of payload and
dummy packets. My algorithms allow flexible tradeoff between traffic concealment
and performance requirement.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The broad acceptance of the IP protocol is driving the Internet to a new level of
performance expectations for its users. A key issue related to the network performance
is congestion control. Adaptability, fairness, utilization, packet loss and smoothness
of traffic flows are common design factors. How to balance these conflicting factors
is an extremely challenging undertaking. Coarse approximation of subtle system
attributes in an ad hoc design process may work on average cases, but they cannot
guarantee real-time performance, and often lead to significant traffic oscillation while
real-time streaming applications require smooth transmission rate. One might argue
that oscillation helps rapid response to resource changes. We will show that, a system
can achieve equally good, if not better, responsiveness and high network utilization,
without inducing oscillation.
Oscillation means boundary stability, but achieving traffic smoothness requires
asymptotical stability of short-term behavior instead of long-term average behavior.
One might argue that linear or other approximation schemes are necessary to contain
the computing complexity, and they would be sufficient to deliver quality service. But
we will show that this subtle issue is critical to asymptotic stability of the system, and
one can make significant performance improvement over existing schemes by proper
incorporation of the discontinuity in control actions into the control and modeling
process, at lower complexity.
The objective of this research is to develop innovative techniques for modeling
and control of network congestion. Most existing network controls have discontinuous
The journal model is IEEE Transactions on Networking.
2actions, but such discontinuity in control actions is commonly omitted in analytical
models, and instead continuous models were widely adopted in the literature. This
approximation works well under certain conditions, but it does cause significant dis-
crepancy in creating robust, responsive control solutions for congestion management.
In this dissertation, I investigated three major topics. I proposed a generic discontin-
uous congestion control model and its design methodology based on the sliding mode
control (SMC) theory. I discussed applicability of this model to some existing flow or
congestion control schemes, e.g. XON/XOFF, rate and window based AIMD, RED,
etc. It can also be effectively applied to design of detection and defense of distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attacks. The fundamental understanding of control actions,
queuing dynamics, and delay leads to a traffic concealment algorithm that can be
used to create pattern-free multicast overlay networks.
Discontinuous congestion control rule, e.g. increase and decrease (I-D) conges-
tion control, is widely adopted in network traffic management because of its cost-
effectiveness. In the second chapter of this dissertation, I proposed a modeling and
design methodology for discontinuous congestion controllers to guarantee asymptotic
stability and eliminate traffic oscillation, based on the SMC theory. A highly appeal-
ing attribute of SMC is that its stability analysis does not require a precise network
dynamics model. My scheme shows that discontinuity plays a crucial role in opti-
mization of the I-D based congestion control algorithms. When properly modeled,
the simple I-D control laws can be made highly robust to parameter and model un-
certainties.
DDoS management can be considered a special case of the flow control problem.
Based on the network traffic models derived in chapter II, I developed a backward-
propagation feedback control strategy for DDoS defense. When a host finds itself
becoming a hot spot, it informs neighboring nodes and routers to reduce influx of
3packets. Reduction of packet influx is propagated backward to the sources. If a
source is normal, it will reduce its sending rate when backpressure is propagated
to it. If a source ignores traffic backpressure and keeps infusing packets, it will be
identified as an attacker and its packets will be dropped. This backward-propagation
feedback control strategy adopts a simple hop-by-hop on-off control scheme. It not
only prevents DDoS attacks but also provides smooth traffic and bounded queue size.
Another application of the congestion control algorithms is design of private
group communication networks, which are critical to some applications, e.g. online
bank transactions, battle field communication, etc.. In addition to cryptographic pro-
tection of information contents, concealment of the network traffic patterns (volumes,
peak times, etc.) is also important to prevent unveiling the interactions between group
members. Otherwise, adversary might use passive analysis of the network traffic to
match certain traffic or patterns with significant application events without explicitly
cracking encrypted messages. Workload padding and packet routing are basic mech-
anisms to counter passive traffic analysis attacks, but workload padding can be very
expensive in terms of bandwidth consumption. The challenge here is how to make
an optimal tradeoff between traffic pattern anonymity and network performance. I
proposed a new technique for protection of group communications by concealment
of sender-recipient pairs. The basic approach is to fragment and disperse encrypted
messages into multicast packets to be transported along different paths, so that the
adversary cannot efficiently determine the source/recipient of a message without cor-
rect ordering of all packets. Packet flows among nodes are made balanced, to eliminate
traffic patterns related to group activities. I proposed a sliding window-based flow
control scheme to control transmission of payload and dummy packets. Our algo-
rithms allow flexible tradeoff between the degree of traffic uniformity, and that of the
performance costs. This is particularly important for an open network environment,
4where the users may not have full control of the network resources.
Details on the three major research themes, their preliminary results, and their
contributions are presented in Chapter II, III and IV, respectively.
5CHAPTER II
MODEL AND DESIGN OF DISCONTINUOUS NETWORK CONGESTION
CONTROL SYSTEMS
Increase and decrease (I-D) congestion control rule is widely adopted in network traffic
management because of its cost-effectiveness. In this chapter we propose a model-
ing and design methodology for I-D congestion controllers to guarantee asymptotic
stability and eliminate traffic oscillation, based on the sliding mode control (SMC)
theory. Our scheme addresses the discontinuous operations of I-D controller that has
been largely disregarded in existing literature, and shows that discontinuity plays a
crucial role in optimization of the I-D based congestion control algorithms.
We show that the design of I-D congestion control systems must consider its
relative degree and zero dynamics to guarantee their asymptotic stability. Analytical
and experimental results show that the relative degree of the rate-based, AIMD flow-
control algorithms is two, while that of the window-based schemes is one. That is, for
optimal control performance (rapid convergence and minimal oscillation), rate-based
AIMD algorithms should use both the queue length error and its first order time
derivative to construct the switching function of an I-D scheme. On the other hand,
for window-based AIMD algorithms one should only use the queue length error in the
switching function.
Based on our analysis, we develop a simple yet accurate queuing model for a
heavily loaded window-based flow control system. Our model matches both the self-
clocking properties of window protocols and their relative degree, i.e., one. Otherwise,
the relative degree of a classic analytical model for window-based AIMD is found to
be two, inconsistent with that of ns-2 simulation, nor does it reflect the fact that the
total input rate is bound under the additive increase rule.
6A. Introduction
Sound bandwidth management is essential to sustain the continual growth of Inter-
net. Congestion/flow control schemes used in different transport protocols need to
guarantee performance for the broad range of end users, and maximize the network
bandwidth utilization. We use “congestion control” and “flow control” interchange-
ably in this chapter Bandwidth management schemes, which may appear to have
good performance results in small scale simulation, need to be closely examined be-
fore they can be deployed. Otherwise, overlooking certain subtle system issues can
lead to substantial performance loss due to persistent or intermittent oscillation. Wild
oscillation results in packet loss, low bandwidth utilization and large delay jitter.
Precise modeling of the network dynamics is critical to the design process in
optimizing the tradeoff between responsiveness, fairness and the degree of oscillation.
In this chapter, we propose a novel modeling and design approach for increase and
decrease (I-D) congestion control based on sliding mode control (SMC) theory [2][3].
Our method sheds new light on understanding of the effect of control discontinuity
on stability and performance of I-D schemes such as Additive-Increase-Multiplicative-
Decrease (AIMD) [4]. By control discontinuity it means that the reaction to changes
of network states for bandwidth adjustment is a discontinuous function. The method-
ology is general enough to serve as a theoretical basis to the design of a broad range
of discontinuous congestion control schemes. Unlike most conventional approaches
that omitted the discontinuity of control actions, our analysis takes discontinuity into
account and it proves affirmatively the asymptotic stability of different congestion
control schemes.
I-D flow control schemes are widely implemented in different network protocols,
e.g. XON/XOFF MAC layer flow control scheme, AIMD, etc. The simplest I-D
7control rule uses a single binary bit sent to the I-D controller to indicate occurrence
of congestion, so that only the sign of the output error is fed back to the I-D controller.
This binary feedback can be implicit, e.g., the 3 duplicate ACK packets in TCP, or
explicit, e.g., the explicit congestion notification (ECN) bit [5]. One or more [6] ECN
bit is commonly used in active queue management (AQM) schemes to inform a sender
of congestion conditions.
A congestion control scheme of this nature can be viewed as a binary deci-
sion control (BDC) system. That is, if an error function, which is also called the
switching function, has a negative (positive) reading then a positive (negative) con-
trol action is engaged. Three critical issues related to design of BDC systems are
(i) timing in setting of the “congestion” bit, (ii) switching function construct, and
(iii) the amount of adjustment in control, i.e., the increase or decrease of the trans-
mission rate or congestion window sizes. Some AQM schemes investigate the timing
in determining when to set the congestion bit(s) of flows on the routers. For exam-
ple, the “binary feedback” scheme proposed by Ramakrishnan and Jain (henceforth
called RJBF) [7], RED [8][9], BLUE [10], the proportional-integral (PI) controller
[11], proportional-differential (PD) controller [12][13], AVQ [14], R-SMVS (a sliding
mode variable structure control scheme proposed by Ren et. al)[15] and variations
of RED [16][17][18][19][20]. They are all designed to work with the additive-increase-
multiplicative-decrease (AIMD) scheme [21] of TCP Tahoe/Reno. How to provide
smooth transport for streaming applications, yet be “TCP-friendly” remains an open
problem [22][23].
Construction of a switching function is the focus of congestion avoidance schemes,
such as AIMD and binomial control [24]. It is widely believed that one could reduce
the degree of oscillation by adjustment of the increase/decrease amounts. For exam-
ple, in [25], Zhang and Shin proposed an α-control scheme with the goal of control-
8ling the maximum queue length to a target range, by adjusting the increase rate of
AIMD. In [26], Lee et. al proposed AIMD/H (AIMD with history), which updates
the decrease ratio of AIMD according to history, to smooth rate/window variations.
However, this is true only to a limited extent because oscillation of I-D control systems
can be caused by delay, measurement error or incorrect configuration of relative de-
gree in switching function. An incorrectly configured I-D control system can become
unstable or even divergent regardless of the adjustment amounts. We demonstrate
this case by a simple example in subsection 5 of section C of this chapter.
AQM and congestion avoidance, being two closely related issues, can be modeled
into a binary decision control (BDC) system, unless when the AQM schemes are
not designed to work with AIMD, e.g., REM [27], GKVQ (Gibbens-Kelly virtual
queue) [28][29], and probabilistic price marking [30][31]. These exceptions will not
be considered in the rest of discussion. Analysis and optimization of the asymptotic
stability and transient behavior of BDC systems are complicated by discontinuity of
the control behavior. When the control action switches according to the + and - sign
of the switching function, it changes the trajectory of the system state.
Despite the profound importance of discontinuity in a BDC system, this issue is
largely ignored in the analysis of AIMD control [8][11][9][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][12][13].
Instead, most existing work adopted a continuous dynamic model, such as that of
window-based AIMD scheme [32] in the TCP Reno as
dW (t)
dt
=
1
R(t)
− W (t)W (t−R(t))
2R(t)
ρ(t−R(t)), (2.1)
where ρ is the packet dropping/marking probability, W the congestion window size,
and R the roundtrip time (RTT). In this model, the discontinuity of AIMD is ap-
proximated by its statistically-averaged behavior. Inherently the control algorithm
9designed based on this model acts according to the statistical average of the controlled
objective, rather than its real-time condition.
Our modeling approach leads to significant performance gains, guaranteed sta-
bility conditions, and quantitative understanding of the tradeoff between oscillation,
delay and fairness. Ignoring control discontinuity might still lead to acceptable per-
formance under certain conditions, but one cannot guarantee the asymptotic stability
of the system. Without knowing the behavior of the system dynamics, the system
is susceptible to recurrent traffic oscillations, and significant packet delays or packet
losses in short time windows. The SMC theory used for analysis of the BDC systems
suggests that the relative degree of an I-D controller plays a significant role in its
stability. While [3] gives a rigorous definition of relative degree, a simple heuristic
method to determine the relative degree is that it equals to the number of times to
take the derivative of the output, until the control input first appears in the right-hand
side of the equation without being encapsulated in another function.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section B of this chapter,
we briefly introduce the idea of sliding mode control. In section C, we describe
the general I-D flow control model and discuss applicability of this model to some
existing flow or congestion control schemes, e.g. XON/XOFF, rate and window based
AIMD, RED, etc. Section D presents our design methodology for general I-D control
rules. Section E of this chapter presents our main results on rate-based and window-
based congestion control. Section F and G provide a theoretical proof of our results.
Section H discusses the transient behavior and delay effects. We make the conclusion
in section I.
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  (a)    (b)    (c) 
Fig. 1. Two-dimensional case. (a) the attraction effect of the switching surface
s(x) = 0; (b) a state trajectory with an idea sliding mode; (c) chattering
behavior when switching does not take place exactly on the switch surface.
B. Sliding Mode Control
A sliding-mode controller force the system under control to evolve on a predetermined
switch manifold, which results in new system dynamics not present in the uncontrolled
system. When the system state deviates from the switching surface s(x) = 0, where
x is the state variable vector of the dynamic system, control is applied on the system
to force it back to the switching surface (see Fig. 1). Control is discontinuous on
the switching surface. For ideal sliding mode control, the system state trajectory will
move toward the switching surface, and then keep evolving on the switching surface
(i.e., the term sliding mode) to converge to the origin if s(x) = 0 is stable. The systems
under the sliding-mode control approach are robust and insensitive to parameter
uncertainties, making them highly tolerant of model uncertainties and disturbance.
The main down side of this approach, however, is the chattering phenomenon, which is
caused by the abrupt change of the state trajectory crossing the sliding manifold, even
for the ideal, zero-delay cases. Switching cannot exactly take place on the switching
surface for real systems, which leads the state trajectory to move back and forth over
11
the surface s(x) = 0.
To construct a sliding mode controller, one must promise the existence and stabil-
ity of the sliding mode. For a special case where the switching surface is constructed
only with output and its derivatives, the dynamics of the sliding mode consists of two
parts, the zero dynamics of the system and the switching function s(y, y˙, y¨, · · ·) = 0.
Therefore, the sliding mode is stable if and only if the system’s zero dynamics and the
switching function s(y, y˙, y¨, · · ·) = 0 are both stable. The stability of zero dynamics
means the system is minimum-phase.
C. I-D Flow Control Models
In this section, we present the general I-D flow control model, and show its applica-
bility to some typical flow control protocols. We assume a generic congestion control
model shown in Fig. 2, where the sender adjusts its sending rate λ by an I-D flow
control rule, based on the traffic conditions. The congested node has a first-in-first-
out (FIFO) queue and it uses some feedback message(s) to inform senders of the
congestion conditions. The primary system parameters include the transmission rate
λ, the queue length q, and the link capacity C.
The switching behavior of a general I-D controller in the sender is depicted in
Fig. 3, where the controller acts in one of three modes, the increase, decrease and
cruise modes. We note that when S1 = S2 “sliding mode” is the standard term
used in SMC theory literature. At the increase (decrease) mode the sender increases
(decreases) its sending rate, and at the cruise mode, the sender tries to stay at the
same state (with possibly some minor rate adjustments.)
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The I-D control rule for the three modes is defined by
u =

u−, if S > S2,
u+, if S < S1,
uc, else,
(2.2)
where u is the control input, u−, u+ and uc are the decrease, increase and cruise rule,
S is the switching function, S1 and S2 (S1 < S2) are the thresholds. The design issue
is how to choose i) the switching function S, ii) thresholds S1 and S2, and iii) u−, u+
and uc. Knowing that full-state feedback is unlikely, we only consider the following
output based switching function (2.3)
S = c0y +
r−1∑
i=1
ci
diy
dti
, (2.3)
where y is some measurement output, e.g. queue length error. A generic description
of the network dynamics is expressed as
x˙ = f(x, u, t), (2.4)
where f is a smooth function, t is the time variable, x stands for the state variable
vector of the network dynamics, and u the control input. The output y is a function
of the network state variables,
y = h(x, t). (2.5)
The network state variables x could be the queue length, changing rate of the queue
length, etc. Our objective is to drive the network dynamics to a desired equilibrium
point in the cruise mode to achieve maximum bandwidth utilization and minimal
oscillation. Next, we show the applicability of our model to some widely adopted flow
control protocols.
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1. XON/XOFF Protocol
IEEE 802.3x standard defines a data-link layer, hop-by-hop backpressure flow control
scheme called XON/XOFF. The flow control rule of XON/XOFF can be described as
λ =

0, if q > q2,
C, if q < q1,
hold, else,
(2.6)
where λ is the sending rate, C is the link capacity, q1 and q2 are the XON and
XOFF thresholds respectively. A node sends an XOFF packet to its upstream node
when its queue length exceeds q2 and it sends an XON packet when its queue length
reduces to q1. A node stops sending packets when it receives an XOFF packet. It
resumes transmission when it receives an XON packet from the same node, or the
XOFF message expires. The goal of XON/XOFF scheme is to control the queue
length to the range between q1 and q2 to avoid queue overflow and underflow. Eq.
(2.6) captures the key property of XON/XOFF scheme although it ignores the XOFF
expiration effects. Clearly (2.6) is consistent with (2.2).
2. Window-Based AIMD Protocol
In a generic window-based AIMD protocol, e.g. RJBF [7] and the congestion avoid-
ance scheme of TCP Tahoe/Reno [33], senders exponentially decrease their congestion
windows (denoted as W ) when they receive a marked ACK packet, otherwise they
linearly increase their congestion windows. In RJBF, the congested node marks an
incoming packet when its queue length is larger than a threshold. The congestion
avoidance scheme of TCP Tahoe/Reno can be viewed as a special case in which the
queue length threshold is the buffer size of the congested node. A TCP sender halves
15
its congestion window when it receives three duplicate ACKs, otherwise increases
its congestion window by one per round trip time. Duplicated ACKs are caused by
packet loss. We ignore packet loss caused by transmission errors because bit error
ratio in modern wired network is very low. The cases of wireless network is beyond
the range of this thesis.
This scheme has only increase and decrease modes, and it does not have the
cruise mode. The control input u is the changing rate of congestion window size,
denoted as W˙ . u− and u+ denote the multiplicative decrease and additive increase
rules respectively. The output y is the queue length of the congested node. The
window-based AIMD control rule can be written as [24]
W˙i =

αw
Ri
, if q < qd,
−Wiβw , else,
(2.7)
where Ri is the roundtrip time of the i
th session.
3. Rate-Based AIMD Protocol
Some representative schemes in this category include the Rate Adaptation Protocol
(RAP) [34], the Loss-Delay Based Adaptation Algorithm LDA+ [6], and the Loss
Tolerant Rate Controller (LTRC) [35]. In RAP, each data packet is acknowledged, and
sender uses ACK packets to detect packet loss and round-trip time. When packet loss
is detected, the sender halves its sending rate. Otherwise, it periodically increases its
sending rate by one packet per round-trip time. LDA+ adaptively adjusts its additive
increase and multiplicative decrease rates based on the network condition. LTRC uses
loss threshold values to determine whether the sender is allowed to increase, maintain
16
or decrease its rate. The control rule of this type of protocols can be expressed as
λ˙i =

αr, if q < qd,
−λiβr , else.
(2.8)
4. Random Early Detection (RED) Protocol
The AQM scheme Random Early Detection (RED) proposed in [8] is designed to
work with TCP or similar protocols. It detects router congestion based on its average
queue length, and disseminates congestion information by packet dropping or ECN
bit marking. The probabilistic rules for packet dropping (or ECN marking) are as
follows:
ρ =

0, if q¯ < q1,
1, if q¯ > q2,
q¯ − q1
q2 − q1 , else,
(2.9)
where ρ is the dropping/marking probability, and q¯ is the average queue length. The
goal of RED is to drive q¯ to a desired equilibrium point, which falls within (q1, q2).
Obviously, (2.9) is a special case of (2.2).
Most literatures on RED, e.g. [11][9], only analyzed its local stability by lineariz-
ing the system around a neighbor of the equilibrium point within (q1, q2) with little
or no discussion on the issues of the transition between the three states. There is no
guarantee that when initially the queue length is less than q1 or larger than q2, RED
would drive the network dynamics into the cruise mode. This assumption makes the
congestion control scheme at a sender susceptible to traffic fluctuation from other
sources. Our model can alleviate this shortfall by taking the full dynamic ranges of
operations into account.
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5. A Simple Example
Referring to the FIFO queue example in Fig. 2, let C be 150 pkt/sec and zero delay,
then the system dynamics of this queuing system can be described by
q˙ = λ− 150, q ≥ 0. (2.10)
We also assume the buffer size is infinite in order to more clearly show if the queuing
system convergent. Our goal is to drive q to 50 packets through increasing /decreasing
the sending rate λ. Thus, the output-measurement error
y = q − 50, (2.11)
and the control variable
u = λ˙. (2.12)
Now we study the stability of (2.10) under the following additive-increase-additive-
decrease (AIAD) control law with different switching functions:
u =

−K, if S ≥ 0,
K, else,
(2.13)
where K is a positive constant. We consider the following three switching functions:
S = y, (2.14)
S = −y + y˙, (2.15)
S = y + y˙. (2.16)
By solving these equations with the 4th order Runge-Kutta numerical integration
method, we got the results plotted in Fig. 4, 5 and 6. For (2.14), with initial state
18
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Fig. 4. The state and temporal trajectories with switching function S = y (K = 40).
Delay is ignored. The switching line is defined by S = 0.
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Fig. 5. The state and temporal trajectories with switching function S = −y + y˙
(K = 200). Delay is ignored. The switching line is defined by S = 0.
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Fig. 6. The state and temporal trajectories with switching function S = y+y˙ (K = 40).
Delay is ignored. The switching line is defined by S = 0.
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(q = 0, q˙ = 0), the close-loop system oscillates, see Fig. 4. For (2.15), with initial
state (q = 100pkt, q˙ = 0pkt/sec), the system is divergent, see Fig. 5. For (16), with
initial state (q = 0, q˙ = 0), it asymptotically converges to an equilibrium point, see
Fig. 6. This example clearly shows the importance of choosing the proper switching
functions, based on the system dynamics, regardless of the complexity (or simplicity)
of the system architecture. We will discuss attractive zones in Fig. 4, 5 and 6 in the
next section.
D. General Design Methodology
The main idea of our method is that we first design the increase and decrease rules
(u+ and u− in (2.2)) to make the system monotonously converge to the cruise mode
within a finite time period, and then maintain the system state at the cruise mode. By
“monotonously converge” it means that the distance to the cruise mode monotonously
decreases until the network state reaches the cruise mode. It makes the system state
converge to the cruise mode and maintain on the cruise mode after the system state
reaching the cruise mode. This is enough for most flow control applications. The
second step is to design the cruise rule (uc in (2.2)) to make the system asymptotically
converge to the desired equilibrium point with continuous system design methods, e.g.
root locus, pole placement, LQG regulator design, etc.
Let Sˆ denote the “distance” to S1 and S2 outside the cruise mode.
Sˆ =

S − S2, if S > S2,
S − S1, if S < S1,
0, else.
(2.17)
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Thus the I-D control law can be rewritten as
u =

u−, if Sˆ > 0,
u+, if Sˆ < 0,
uc, else.
(2.18)
Monotonously decreasing of |Sˆ| implies that Sˆ ˙ˆS < 0. That is, when Sˆ < 0, ˙ˆS > 0
and when Sˆ > 0,
˙ˆ
S < 0, where
˙ˆ
S is the time derivative of Sˆ. The attractive zone of
the cruise mode is defined as {x : Sˆ ˙ˆS < 0}. Within the attractive zone, the network
states will be attracted into the cruise mode. Furthermore, when
Sˆ
˙ˆ
S ≤ η|Sˆ|,where η > 0, (2.19)
is satisfied, the system will reach the cruise mode within a finite time period
|Sˆ0|
η
[3], where Sˆ0 is the initial value of Sˆ, and the convergence rate to the cruise mode is
proportional to η.
Based on this methodology, to guarantee overall system asymptotical stability,
i.e., the controlled object (2.4) and (2.5) together with the controller (2.2) and (2.3),
we must meet the following conditions [36]:
i. If the relative degree of the input-output system defined by (2.4) and (2.5) with
input u and output S is r, one should use to construct the switching function
S.
ii. The zero dynamics of the input-output system defined by (2.4) and (2.5) is
asymptotically stable, or it is minimum phase.
iii. cr−1pr−1 + cr−2pr−2 + ...+ c1p+ c0 is a Hurwitz polynomial.
iv. Under the cruise control uc, (2.4) is asymptotically stable.
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The four conditions are sufficient for asymptotical convergence to an equilibrium
point. Condition i guarantees that the control input u explicitly appears in the ex-
pression of S˙ so that we can change the sign of S˙ through switching of the control
input. Satisfying Conditions i-iii is sufficient for asymptotically converging to a lim-
ited cycle with bounded oscillation level, roughly S1 < y < S2. When S1 = S2,
Conditions i-iii are sufficient for asymptotically converging to an equilibrium point,
where y = S1.
For a nonlinear system, its zero dynamics is equivalent to the role of zeros for a
linear system. When Condition iii holds, Condition ii is equivalent to the condition
that the zero dynamics with output S defined in (2.3) is asymptotically stable, or, it
is minimum phase with output S. In fact, the zero dynamics with output S defined
in (2.3), which is exactly the dynamics of the sliding mode, is the combination of two
elements [2][36]: the zero dynamics with output y and
c0y +
r−1∑
i=1
ci
diy
dti
= 0. (2.20)
Condition iii guarantees the differential equation (2.20) is asymptotically stable.
Coefficients cr, cr−1, · · · , c0 are manually determined to meet Condition iii. u−(x, t)
and u+(x, t) determine the range of the attractive zone of the cruise mode, so that
within the attractive zone, the control rules can bring the state trajectory back to the
cruise mode. Their values are proportional to the speed of state trajectory changes.
When the system has non-negligible delays, measurement errors, or finite control fre-
quency, control switching cannot take place exactly on the switching line (manifold),
which will cause state chattering. For these non-ideal cases, large control values will
aggravate the degree of chattering (see Fig. 7). The quantitative tradeoff between
these factors is essential to the optimal design of the congestion control algorithms.
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Fig. 7. The state trajectory of the simple FIFO queue example under control law
(2.13), where S = y + y˙, K = 40 and with delay 50 ms.
For the simple FIFO queue control example given in the end of section C of
chapter II, on page 14, its relative degree is two. By choosing S = y, it violates
Condition i so that one cannot make S = 0 attractive through switching control
input u. Its oscillation level is just dependent on the initial q and λ. S = −y+ y˙ and
S = y + y˙ satisfy Condition I so that within the attractive zone both of them can
drive the state trajectory to S = 0. However, the attractive zone under control law
(2.13) is limited because its control is limited. S = −y + y˙ = 0 is divergent because
it violates Condition iii so that the state trajectory will escape from the attractive
zone.
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E. Main Results
In this section, we study the stability of rate-based and window-based AIMD conges-
tion control protocols. To single out the effects of relative degree on the performance
outcomes, we focus on the relationship between relative degree and the asymptotic
stability, without considering the transient on-set behavior of a new session.
In the experiments, we tested the effects of relative degree by using two different
switching functions,
SF1: S = y, (2.21)
and
SF2: S = y + c1y˙, (2.22)
where y = q− qd. q is the actual queue length and qd is the target queue length. Eqs.
(2.21) and (2.22) respectively represent feedback control schemes that have relative
degrees of one and two.
In the real implementation of (2.22), we use the following differential equation
to approximate q˙
q˙(t) ≈ q¯i − q¯i−1
∆t
(2.23)
where t ∈ [i∆t, (i+ 1)∆t) and q¯i is the average queue length within the time interval
[(i− 1)∆t, i∆t).
1. Rate-Based AIMD
In rate-based AIMD scheme, the sender keeps sending data at the current rate until
it receives one-bit congestion status, which is set by the router, and is transmitted
back by the receiver to the sender via the ACK packet. The source linearly increases
its sending rate with rate α(> 0) if the congestion bit is 0; otherwise, the sending rate
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is decreased exponentially with time constant β(> 0). Note that in our simulation,
the source does not retransmit lost packets, because this assumption does not have
effect on the relative degree properties. This AIMD configuration is consistent with
(2.2), and thus can be analyzed by our model.
In our ns-2 simulation, we assume that a single link of capacity 10 Mbps is shared
by 15 connections with RTT ranging from 40 ms to 200 ms. These connections started
randomly within 0.1 second. The average packet size is 1000 bytes, the buffer size 100
packets, and qd = 50 packets is our control goal. Because we are mainly interested
in the recurrent behavior of AIMD, we simply initialized the sending rate of each
sources as 650 Kbps and set α = 10pkts/sec2, β = 8.3sec, without considering the on-
set effects. We always set c1 = 1 unless otherwise stated. This configuration satisfies
αβ = C/N , where C is the link capacity, so that at equilibrium, the increase rate is
equal to the decrease rate [37].
The ns-2 simulation results of using SF1 and SF2 are plotted in Fig. 8. It is
clear that the oscillation of the queue length in (2.22) is much smaller than that in
(2.21). Consistent results from numerical and ns-2 simulations repeatedly showed that
oscillation was reduced drastically when the relative degree was correctly configured.
Next, we consider the state trajectories of the two switching functions. For SF1,
which does not take into account of the relative degree, there exists a large cycle on
the state trajectory, (see Fig. 9) in which the switching manifold is the vertical dotted
line passing the coordinate (50,0). On the other hand, for SF2, the state trajectory
(see Fig. 10) does chatter around the switching manifold, which is the straight dotted
line connecting coordinates (0, 50) and (50, 0). From the design viewpoint, the results
suggest that without taking into account the relative degree, it will be very difficult
to contain the control behavior of the system to a certain range of the target utility
function, let alone any notion of performance guarantee. Chattering and scattering of
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Fig. 8. Instant queue length traces based on SF1 and SF2.
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Fig. 9. State trajectory for SF1.
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Fig. 10. State trajectory for SF2 with c1 = 1.
state trajectories depicted in the simulations were caused by delay, non-zero control
period and measurement error that prevented switching from falling on the switching
manifold perfectly. Provided that the relative degree is properly configured, these
factors only have limited effects on our analysis outcomes, as it was shown in our
numerical and simulation studies.
Next, we compared the performance results of using different α and β values. The
RTT is set to be less than 10−6 ms to rule out the effects of delays. Our simulation
results on using different α and β values in SF1 are plotted in Fig. 11. For SF1,
despite the significant phase differences under different configurations, their levels of
oscillation were very close to each other. We caution that after the relative degree is
properly chosen, one still needs to optimize the α and β values to minimize chattering
caused by delay. There is tradeoff between minimizing chattering and response time.
For the SF2 example depicted in Fig. 12, one can see that lager α and smaller β
result in larger oscillation and faster response (smaller rising time).
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2. Window-Based AIMD
The self-clocked behavior [21] of the window-based congestion control systems makes
its dynamic characteristics totally different from that of its rate-based counterpart.
Through a similar modeling and simulation process of SF1 and SF2 for a window-
based system, we concluded that the relative degree of the window-based congestion
control system is one when the output is queue length error and control input is the
variation rate of congestion window size.
In the experiment, we assume that a single link of capacity 2Mbps is shared by
15 TCP NewReno [33] connections that started randomly within the first 0.1 second,
and the delay was set at 60 ms and 66 ms. Other simulation parameters remain
unchanged. That is, average packet size is 1000 bytes, buffer size 100 packets, and
qd = 50 packets. A TCP NewReno sender decreases its cwnd by βwcwnd packets for
each received marked ACK, while increases its cwnd by αw/cwnd packets for each
received unmarked ACK. For reasons similar to the analysis of rate based systems,
we directly initialized the congestion window (cwnd) size of each source as one packet
and disabled the slow start mechanism. The router marks a packet when S defined
by (2.21) or (2.22) is positive. We set αw = 0.5, βw = 0.01, without considering the
on-set phase of a session. As usual, c1 = 1.
Fig. 13 shows that the queue length of the congested link asymptotically con-
verges for both SF1 and SF2. However, SF1 reaches the target queue length, which
is 50, but SF2 has a large steady-state error from the target queue length. Given the
equilibrium point (50, 0), the state trajectory diagram for SF1 is shown in Fig. 14
where the system converges to the equilibrium point. On the other hand, Fig. 15
clearly shows that the system swings in but stays off the target equilibrium point for
SF2. Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 also show that for window-based AIMD, the total input rate
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Fig. 14. State trajectory for SF1 (window-based case).
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Fig. 15. State trajectory for SF2 with c1 = 1 (window-based case).
(equals to the queue length variant rate plus the link capacity) is bounded, while Fig.
9 and Fig. 10 show that for rate-based systems, there is an overshot-the total input
rate keeps increasing until crossover the switching line. Bounded total input rate in
window-based AIMD is caused by its self-clocking property. The bounded total in-
put rate cannot be explained by a widely-accepted queuing model for window-based
systems. We will further discuss this issue in section G of this chapter.
F. Analysis for Rate-Based Systems
In this section, we discuss asymptotic stability conditions and other related issues for
rate-based AIMD systems.
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1. Rate-Based Network Model
We assume that the congested link is shared by N sources. Let q denote the queue
length of that link, C link capacity, λi the sending rate of source i, ζ the total input
rate to the link, ζ(t) =
∑N
i=1 λi(t− τFi), and τFi the (outbound) delay from source i
to the link. We get
q˙(t) = −CG(q(t), ζ(t)) + ζ(t) + Cˆ(t), (2.24)
where Cˆ(t) represents short-term non-responsive traffic, and G(·, ·) the instantaneous
link utilization. In a general sense, we assume that G(·, ·) is a function of q and ζ so
that it can represent bandwidth allocation schemes on the router that make allocation
decisions based on current queue length and input rate.
It is obvious that 0 ≤ G(q, ζ) ≤ 1 for q > 0, ζ > 0. For mathematical complete-
ness, we further assume that G(q, ζ) is twice differentiable with respect to q and ζ. In
a real system, any increase in ζ should lead to increase in q˙. That is, ∂qˆ∂ζ > 0 should
hold. By plugging this condition into (2.24), it is easy to get
G
ζ
<
1
C
. (2.25)
Now, our goal is to drive y = q−qd to zero by adjusting λi. To reduce chattering
of λi, we adjust λˆi in the same way as the existing AIMD scheme. By introducing
new control variables ui ≡ λ˙i, we get
ζ˙(t) =
N∑
i=1
ui(t− τFi). (2.26)
2. System Properties
The first property that we want to address is the relative degree of rate-based con-
gestion control schemes, in addition to the empirical evidences presented earlier.
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Theorem 1 The relative degree of the input-output system defined by (2.24) and
(2.26) is two, when the output is y and control variable is ui, respectively.
Proof: It is easy to verify that ∂y˙∂ui
= 0 and ∂y¨∂ui
= 1. This means that control input
ui explicitly appears in y¨ but not in y˙. The theorem stands based on the definition
of the relative degree.
According to conditions I and III in Section D of chapter II, we now choose
S = y+ c1y˙, c1 > 0, as the switching function. Next we consider the minimum phase
condition.
Theorem 2 The zero dynamics of the system defined by (2.24) and (2.26) is asymp-
totically stable when the output is S = y + c1y˙, c1 > 0.
Proof: We define a transform 
z1 = S,
z2 = y.
(2.27)
Its Jacobi matrix 
∂z1
∂q
∂z1
∂ζ
∂z2
∂q
∂z2
∂ζ
 =
 1− c1C
∂G
∂q c1 − c1C
∂G
∂ζ
1 0
 (2.28)
is nonsingular because ∂G∂ζ 6=
1
C for arbitrary q and ζ. Thus, transform (2.27) is a
global diffeomorphism. Applying (2.27) to (2.24) and (2.26), we get
S˙ = z˙1 = (1− c1C∂G
∂q
q˙) + c1(1− C∂G
∂ζ
)ζ˙ + c1
˙ˆ
C, (2.29)
z˙2 =
z1 − z2
c1
. (2.30)
Substituting z1 = 0 into (2.30), we conclude that, when the output is S = y + c1y˙,
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the zero dynamics of the system defined by (2.24) and (2.26) can be expressed as
z˙2 =
−z2
c1
. (2.31)
Obviously, (2.31) is asymptotically stable for c1 > 0.
Theorem 2 is equivalent to the condition that the zero dynamics of the system
defined by (2.24) and (2.26) is asymptotically stable when the output is y.
3. Parameter Setting
There are three parameters to configure an AIMD controller with the switching func-
tion SF2: c1, α and β. First, we consider c1, which determines the dynamics of the
cruise mode. Generally, we set c1 = 1 in experiments. If it is set too large, there
will be significant damping effect on the sliding mode. If c1 is set too small, it would
require significant increase (decrease) of the α (β), in order to guarantee stability,
i.e., see (2.36) and (2.37), without running into implementation problems.
Next, we discuss how to determine α and β values in AIMD. By definition, the
AIMD adjustment rules can be expressed as
ui(t) =

α, if S(t− τBi) < 0,
−λi(t)β , else,
(2.32)
where τBi is the backward delay from the link to source i. In selecting the values
of α and β, one needs to ensure that the system (including the AIMD controller) is
asymptotically stable, and that it converges in the shortest time.
For practicality reasons, we want to derive a simple design rule of α and β that
can adequately address our system needs, without overly complicating the analysis.
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First, we consider the case of homogeneous sources. That is,
ζ ∼= Nλi. (2.33)
The simulation results show that the impact of delay is relatively small comparing
with relative degree, and thus, we omit the delay terms in the subsequent discussion.
We will discuss delay effects later. To satisfy the sliding condition (2.19), we discuss
the following cases:
• When S < 0, S˙ > η. From (2.29), (2.25), (2.32) and (2.33), we have
α >
η − (1− c1C∂G∂q q˙)− c1
˙ˆ
C
(1− C∂G∂ζ )c1N
. (2.34)
• Similarly, when S > 0, S˙ < −η. We have
1
β
>
η + (1− c1C∂G∂q q˙) + c1
˙ˆ
C
(1− C∂G∂ζ )c1ζ
. (2.35)
where η > 0. Eqs. (2.34) and (2.35) together guarantee the sliding mode exists. The
state trajectory will reach S = y + c1y˙ = 0 within time
|S0|
η , S0 is the initial value
of S. This condition gives a clear guideline on how long one needs to wait before the
system can reach its sliding mode from an initial state. Based on Theorem 2, the
asymptotical stability of the sliding mode is guaranteed, and we directly arrive at the
following theorem:
Theorem 3 Under the AIMD control law (2.32) with a switching function S = y +
c1y˙, c1 > 0, the queuing dynamic system defined by (2.24) and (2.26) is stable if
(2.34) and (2.35) hold.
Note that the stability conditions (2.34) and (2.35) define the attractive zone of
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the switching manifold S = y+c1y˙ = 0. Within the attractive zone, |S|monotonically
decreases until reaching the switching manifold. Increasing α and 1/β values will
increase the size of the attractive zone, and also increase the rate of convergence
to the sliding mode (see (2.29)). However, due to delay, inaccurate measurement,
etc., the switching between increase and decrease cannot take place on the switching
manifold perfectly, and it causes chattering around the switching manifold. The
degree of chattering is proportional to the values of α and 1/β.
Theorem 4 Given that a desired attractive zone is ZA and disturbance Cˆ is bound
within D, we should choose the following α and 1/β values to guarantee that the
switching manifold is attractive within ZA:
α = sup
{q,ζ}∈ZA
η − (1− c1C
∂G
∂q )q˙ − c1
˙ˆ
C
(1− C∂G∂ζ )c1N
 , (2.36)
1
β
= sup
{q,ζ}∈ZA
η + (1− c1C
∂G
∂q )q˙ + c1
˙ˆ
C
(1− C∂G∂ζ )c1ζ
 . (2.37)
By using (2.34) and (2.35), it is trivial to prove that these conditions hold. For
heavily-loaded cases, G ∼= 1, and (2.36) and (2.37) can be simplified into
α = sup
η − ζ + C − Cˆ − c1 ˙ˆC
c1N
 , (2.38)
1
β
= sup
η + ζ − C + Cˆ + c1 ˙ˆC
c1ζ
 . (2.39)
When the disturbance is slow-changing the required attractive zone of the switching
manifold is defined by ζ ∈ [k1C, k2C], where 0 < k1 < 1 < k2, and Cˆ ∈ [0, k3C],
0 < k3 < 1. In this case, we ignore
˙ˆ
C and simplify the equations for α and β, i.e.,
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Eqs. (2.38), and (2.39), into the following simple forms:
α ∼= η + (1− k1)C
c1N
, (2.40)
β ∼= c1
[
1 +
k3
k1
− 1
k2
+
η
k1C
]−1
. (2.41)
At the equilibrium point, when the system remains stable, it would be useful to
keep the increase rate the same as decrease rate [37]. In that case, we can set
αβ ∼= C
N
. (2.42)
If this constraint is adopted, then one of the two equations (2.40) and (2.41) can be
omitted.
I note that in addition to the theoretical bounds derived above, one needs to
exercise caution in physical design, to make sure that the degree of oscillation within
the guaranteed zone is acceptable. For instance, the α and 1/β values used in the
example of Fig. 12 are smaller than the bounds defined in (2.38) and (2.39). Even
though the system eventually converges, the level of oscillation is not negligible.
G. Analysis for Window-Based Systems
In this section, we present theoretical analysis of the window-based AIMD systems
to prove their asymptotic stability conditions, and other related issues.
1. Window-Based Network Model
For a window-based AIMD system, our ns-2 simulations show that its relative degree
is one. This finding contradicts the widely adopted model (2.43) where the relative
degree is two, because one must differentiate the output q twice until the control
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variable W˙i explicitly appears.
q˙ =
N∑
i=1
Wi
Ri
− C. (2.43)
Moreover, according to (2.43), the total input rate would increase until over-
shooting the switching line, while ns-2 simulation results showed that the total input
rate stopped increasing far before crossing the switching line (see subsection 2 of sec-
tion E). Here, we suggest a simple alternative to eliminate the discrepancy between
(2.43) and simulations. Note that (2.43) characterizes the fact that within a round
trip time Ri, sender i sends out Wi packet, but it does not reflect the fact that the
total ACK packet rate equals to the congested link’s capacity when heavily loaded.
By the self clocking property, a new packet does not enter the network until an ACK
packet is received. Omitting this property results in the discrepancy between (2.43)
and ns-2 simulations. To improve this model, within time period ∆t, sender i gets mi
ACKs and increases its congestion window by ∆Wi, so that it sends out mi + ∆Wi
new packets within time period ∆t. Then we have
∆q(t) =
N∑
i−1
[mi(t− τFi) + ∆Wi(t− τFi)]− C∆t, (2.44)
where τFi is session i’s forward transmission delay from sender i to the congested link.
By the self-clocking property we have
∆q(t) =
N∑
i−1
[mi(t− τFi) + ∆Wi(t− τFi)]− C∆t, (2.45)
where τBi is session i’s transmission delay from the congested link to receiver i and
then to sender i, Ci(t) is the portion of the congested link’s capacity consumed by
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session i at time instant t, where
N∑
i−1
Ci(t) = C. (2.46)
Therefore,
∆q(t) =
N∑
i−1
∆Wi(t− τFi) +$∆t, (2.47)
where $ ≡ ∑Ni−1Ci(t− τFi − τBi)− C. Thus, in the heavily loaded cases,
q˙(t) =
N∑
i−1
W˙i(t− τFi) +$. (2.48)
$ can be viewed as a noise due to heterogeneous roundtrip delays. The relative
degree of (2.48) is one when control input is W˙i and output is q, which is consistent
with ns-2 simulations.
Theorem 5 The relative degree of the system defined by (2.48) is one, when the
output is y and control variable is W˙i, respectively.
Proof: We just need to differentiate y once to make W˙i explicitly appear.
With (2.48), it is easy to explain why the total input rate is bounded for window-
based systems. By definition, the window-based AIMD adjustment rules [24] can be
expressed as
uwi ≡ W˙i =

αw, if S(t− τBi) < 0,
−Wi(t)βw , else.
(2.49)
Eq. (2.7) is a special case of (2.49) with S = q − qd. Substituting (2.49) into (2.48),
we get
q˙(t) = Nαw +$. (2.50)
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in the increase mode. Therefore, the total input rate
ζ = q˙(t) + C = Nαw +
N∑
i−1
Ci(t− τFi − τBi). (2.51)
Eq. (2.51) clearly shows that the total input rate is bounded when N is constant
because αw is constant and all Ci(t − τFi − τBi) is bounded, which means the total
input rate does not increase with window sizes Wi.
Theorem 6 The zero dynamics of the system defined by (2.48) is asymptotically
stable when the output is S = q − qd.
Proof: (2.48) is a linear equation. It is minimum phase.
2. Window-Based Parameter Setting
Two parameters αw and βw need to be configured for a window-based AIMD controller
with the switching function SF1. In selecting the values of αw and βw, one needs to
ensure that the system (including the AIMD controller) is asymptotically stable, and
converges in minimum time. Similar to the rate-based cases, we first consider the
case of homogeneous sources and omit the delay terms. For SF1, we get
S˙ = q˙(t) = NW˙i +$. (2.52)
According to (2.19), we discuss the following two cases:
• When S < 0, S˙ > η, from (2.48), we have
αw >
η −$
N
. (2.53)
• When S > 0, S˙ < −η, we have
1
βw
>
η +$
NWi
. (2.54)
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where η > 0. Eqs. (2.53) and (2.54) together guarantee the sliding mode is attractive
and the state trajectory will reach S = y = 0 within time
|S0|
η , from an initial state
S = S0. Based on Theorem 6, the asymptotical stability of the sliding mode is
guaranteed. Based on these results, we directly arrive at the following theorem:
Theorem II.1 Under the AIMD control law (2.49) with a switching function S = y,
the queuing dynamics defined by (2.48) is stable if (2.53) and (2.54) hold.
Inequalities (2.53) and (2.54) define the attractive zone of the switching manifold
S = y = 0. Increasing αw and 1/βw values will enlarge the attractive zone, and also
increase the rate of convergence to the sliding mode (see (2.52)). Similar to rate-
based systems, the degree of chattering due to delay or inaccurate measurements is
proportional to the values of αw and 1/βw.
H. Transient Behavior and Delay Effects
η determines the speed of convergence toward the switching manifold. Within the
cruise mode, the system dynamics is shaped by the switching function. To reduce the
system response time, we prefer a larger η, or equivalently, larger α and β − 1. On
the other hand, in order to reduce the chattering caused by delay, we need smaller α
and β−1. Clearly, there is a need to balance the two conflicting factors. A tradeoff is
made by using the boundary layer method [2][3]. It has been proven that this method
can contain the oscillation in a bounded range. The basic idea of the boundary layer
method is to suppress chattering by smoothing the discontinuity of the control within
the cruise mode. It is based on an observation that the control variable should be
reduced with S approaching to S0 defined as (S1 + S2)/2. As such, we adopt the
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following cruise mode control law:
uci =

α
∣∣∣∣ S − S0S1 − S0
∣∣∣∣ , S1 ≤ S ≤ S0,
−λiβ
∣∣∣∣ S − S0S2 − S0
∣∣∣∣ , S0 < S ≤ S2.
(2.55)
I empirically choose S1 = Q/4 and S2 = (3Q)/4. If (S2 − S1) is too small, the
performance effect is not obvious. But if too large, it tends to reduce the sensitivity
of the control. α and β are determined based on (2.40) and (2.41). To implement
(2.55), it needs to use explicit feedback messages that carry the numerical values of∣∣∣∣ S − S0S1 − S0
∣∣∣∣ or ∣∣∣∣ S − S0S2 − S0
∣∣∣∣ to the sources for execution.
I. Conclusion
In this chapter, we developed a general I-D congestion control model that character-
izes the control dynamics, queuing dynamics, and the predominating system perfor-
mance factors. We proved that the relative degree of rate-based congestion control
systems is two while that of the window-based congestion control systems is one.
We devised a design methodology to guarantee the asymptotic stability of the con-
gestion control system. Without such considerations, heuristic design approaches to
optimization of congestion control systems will only have limited effects.
With our model, the complex interplay between different system parameters
can be governed via a few simple equations and conditions. Our method permits
one to make the tradeoff between the amount of feedback information, delay, and
the expected performance effects, under explicitly defined conditions. There is little
restriction on the system model, making it broadly applicable to a wide range of
congestion control systems.
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CHAPTER III
DEFENSE OF THE DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS
In this chapter we propose a coordinated defense scheme of distributed denial of service
(DDoS) network attacks, based on the backward-propagation, on-off control strategy.
When a DDoS attack is in effect, a high concentration of malicious packet streams
are routed to the victim in a short time, making it a hot spot. The performance
impact on the hot spot is related to the total hot packet rate that can be tolerated by
the victim. Based on the sliding mode control (SMC) theory, we present a backward
pressure propagation, feedback control scheme to defend DDoS attacks. We develop
our solutions based on the generic discontinuous flow control model developed in
chapter II to analyze the dynamics of network traffic, and develop the algorithms
for rate-based and queue-length-based feedback control. We show a simple design to
implement our control scheme on a practical switch queue architecture.
A. Introduction
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), is a relatively simple, yet very powerful tech-
nique to attack Internet resources. With little or no advance warning, a DDoS attack
can abruptly drain the computing and communication resources of its victim within
a short time, until the attack is resolved. Even some of the largest computer mak-
ers and web-based service providers are not immune from this problem [38][39][40].
DDoS exploits the inherent weakness of the Internet system architecture and its open
resource access model. Unless special care is taken, a DDoS victim can suffer from
damages ranging from system shutdown, file corruption, and total or partial loss of
services. Even if the victim can cope with the surged demands, the unwanted, dis-
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rupting packet flows often lead to serious performance degradation. DDoS attacking
programs have very simple logic structures and small memory sizes, making them rel-
atively easy to implement and hide. Given the openness of the Internet, a malicious
hacker can gradually scan the Internet to plant attacking programs into unprotected
hosts, at relatively low risks of being noticed. After the attacker accumulates enough
compromised hosts, he just needs to issue the attacking command to a coordinating
machine, which then wakes up the dormant attacking programs to hit the victim(s)
from everywhere. The attacker can set the actual attack time so far away from release
of attack commands that it becomes virtually impossible to trace the real attackers.
It is trivial to hit victims at scheduled strengths and durations.
Several DDoS attack schemes [41][42][43][44][45][46][47] have been widely pub-
lished on the Internet, with many others being developed. The first is UDP flooding
in which the victim(s) is flooded with UDP packets. TCP SYN flooding exploits the
3-way handshaking procedure in the TCP protocol. The attacker merely sends large
amounts of SYN packets, with spoofed source addresses, to the victim requesting
for connections. The victim may quickly exhaust its resources if a large number of
bogus connection requests are not resolved in time. A brute force attack is simply
sending a large number of ACK/data packets to the victim even without established
TCP connections. This attack approach is designed to suffocate the communication
channels of the victim. The “ping of death” attack is to flood the victim with the
ICMP echo packets, until it brings an unprepared host to its knee. A simple variation
of the ping of death is to set the spoofed address to that of another victim. This way,
receivers of both the ICMP echo and ICMP echo reply packets will suffer from high
performance losses.
As mentioned earlier, the cooperative resource access model of the Internet archi-
tecture is the root of the DDoS problems. Numerous operational solutions are pub-
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lished for the Internet community [48][49][50][51][52][53][54][55][56][47][57][58]. We
note that it is possible to defend DDoS attacks using simple flow control techniques,
with little or no modifications to the IP protocols. The center issue here is how to
design an efficient congestion controller that can deal with ill posed traffic conditions.
DDoS management can be considered a special case of the flow control problem,
which has been widely studied, e.g. [1],[59],[60],[21],[61],[30],[31], etc. The optimal
control theory is proposed in [1] to manage the network traffic, on the basis of a
nonlinear dynamic flow model. This technique needs to use explicit parameters of
the network model, making it of limited practical values in real systems, because of
its high sensitivity to parameter uncertainties. Binary feedback control [7] is widely
used in network traffic control for its simplicity and efficiency. It relies upon a one-
bit indicator in each probing packet to determine the congestion status of a network
resource. The key design issue here is the threshold value(s) to set and reset the
indicator bit. When combined with the sliding mode control approach [2][3][36][62],
they become a very effective and robust approach to optimize the threshold(s) of the
binary feedback control scheme. The advantages of the sliding mode control scheme
are its simplicity and robustness to parameter and model uncertainty.
In this chapter, we develop a backward-propagation feedback control strategy for
DDoS defense. When a host finds itself becoming a hot spot, it informs neighboring
nodes and routers to reduce influx of attacking packets. By using the notion of
relative degree (see [3],[63] or Appendix A) of nonlinear dynamic systems, we develop
a simple on-off control strategy that does not require the use of a precise traffic model
for such information like attack sources, and system configuration. A routing device
just needs to be informed of the acceptable level of traffic rates from its (destination)
neighbors, so that it can set the acceptable input rates to its (source) neighbors.
Clearly, selection of the on and off thresholds is a key factor. The obvious selection of
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using one fixed-goal threshold variable for throttling is unrealistic because of the sizes
and complex behavior of a large network. One can see that this control scheme is not
involved with any routing information, but is merely based on the mutually agreed
throughput levels for coordinated defense of the DDoS attacks. We derive the stable
(oscillation free, asymptotically convergent) conditions to turn on-off throttling.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section B of this chapter presents
the network model being considered, and the basic characteristics of a generic routing
device. section C discuss the rate-based and queue-based control algorithms. A simple
architecture to implement the flow control algorithms is presented in Section D, and
the chapter concludes in section E.
B. System Model
Our model is aimed at a macroscopic solution approach. We assume that participating
routing devices support flow control for their input and output ports. When a peer
relationship is established between two nodes, they execute flow regulating policies
periodically. For its enormous sizes, and the significant differences of routing devices,
it is impractical to take the entire Internet into a single model for our design. Instead,
we propose a divide and conquer approach to partition the global network into smaller
clusters, so that the DDoS defense can be implemented in a hierarchical manner. As
a heuristic choice, and without loss of generality, we propose to define a cluster as
three connected nodes, see Fig. 16. It is not difficult to expand the model to 2, 4, or
5-node based clusters.
In this chapter, we focus on the intra-cluster analysis, where the delays for data
exchange and control actions are negligible. The inter-cluster coordinated defense
needs to use different design methodologies and solution algorithms, because of their
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Fig. 16. The network model for backward propagation, feedback control, and the
generic switch architecture and its packet flow model in the network.
much larger capacity, delays, and traffic volume. It is also necessary to better un-
derstand the relative degree properties of large networks, in order to prevent the
coordinated defense algorithms from oscillation and other well known stability issues.
Let us now consider the switch architecture in the cluster. Modern switching
fabrics have high throughput with small blocking probabilities . Most of the packet
delays in the routing devices are due to buffering and channel contention. Despite
the obvious benefit of using dedicated resources for channels in the defense of DDoS,
the shared memory-bus architecture is the choice of architecture in practice, for its
better flexibility and lower costs. As a result, we adopt the switch architecture shown
in Fig. 16, and the packet flow model proposed in [1]. We note that when an IP
resource, e.g., a popular Internet web site, is under DDoS attack, its neighbors may
or may not experience heavy traffic. A feedback control strategy based on the relative
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performance measure of a routing device, e.g., “the device is experiencing unusually
high traffic,” is not a reliable indicator for detection of DDoS attacks, because such
observation could be caused by harmless surge of the service requests. On the other
hand, if a DDoS attack has been positively identified, such an indicator (traffic surge)
can be an excellent cue to trace and curtail the DDoS attack. Once an attack is
confirmed, the backward prorogation control rules should be engaged, regardless of
the current workload condition. Although not explicitly discussed here, one can use
propagation paths of the feedback control signals to determine the sources, routing,
density and frequency of the attack.
For packet throttling, we use the sliding mode control theory to construct rate-
based, and queue-length-based feedback control strategies. In practice, some routing
devices that support layer-4 switching would be able to differentiate malicious packets
but most others not. In our study, we use the same system models but different
switching functions to analyze both cases. One might speculate that given that the
DDoS streams are identified, why not just dropping their packets. We note that
this approach implies that the routing devices must have full knowledge of the DDoS
attacks, i.e., packet types, interactive sequences between the attacking machines and
the victim, session states, etc., to avoid dropping regular packets. Furthermore,
without packet dropping, one can more reliably push the throttling pressure back to
the DDoS sources. An unexpected advantage of this non-dropping scheme is that we
can easily generalize the DDoS defense solutions for congestion prevention and flow
control during normal operations.
The backward-propagation feedback control is inexpensive and easy to imple-
ment. One key issue for the backward-propagation feedback control strategy is its
stability. It was observed in [64] that, even for the highly regular multiprocessor
environment, a backward-propagation congestion control algorithm may oscillate or
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even break down at change of workload conditions. Due to the highly dynamic nature
of the network traffic, we adopt the SMC model of chapter II for congestion control
that only makes use of the only output measurements (traffic rate or buffer queue
length) without considering the complete system states. As discussed in chapter II
when the sliding controller is applied to a system with relative degree r, one must use
0, 1, · · · , (r − 1)th order derivatives of the outputs, to construct the sliding manifolds
[65][66]. The other condition [65][66] for system stability is that the corresponding
zero dynamic is stable, or equivalently, the system is minimum-phase [3][63]. The
minimum-phase property can be obtained through proper selection of the outputs.
The third factor that commonly leads to oscillation is the control delay, which when
large enough prevent switching from taking place on the switch manifold(s), and
produce chattering.
1. Fluid Dynamic Model [1]
In this chapter, we adopted the notations and system conditions from [1], where
multiple input flows enter the switch from directly connected hosts or other switches,
and then be routed to the output queues. We denote the collection of nodes by
N = {Ni, Nj, Nk, · · ·}, and the collection of unidirectional links by L = {Lij, Ljk, · · ·}.
The volume of total traffic entering Nj is
λj(t) = ϕj(t)rj(t) +
∑
i
ξij(t)λ
c
ij(t), (3.1)
where
rj(t) is the rate of packets arriving at Nj from outside of the cluster,
ϕj(t) denotes the admitted portion of input traffic, rj(t),
λcij(t) is the traffic demand generated by Nito Nj,
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ξij(t) denotes the admitted portion of the traffic from Ni to Nj, ξ
c
ij(t).
The first-order equilibrium equations for Lj,k are defined in (3.2) to (3.5).
x˙jk(t) = −µjk(t)Gjk(xjk(t)) + λinjk(t), (3.2)
where the occupancy of the buffer associated with Lj,k is denoted as xjk, µjk (µjk > 0)
the bandwidth of Lj,k, and the function µjkGjk(xjk) is the outbound traffic:
µjk(t)Gjk(xjk(t)) = λ
r
jk(t) + λ
c
jk(t). (3.3)
The traffic rejected at Lj,k is
λrjk(t) = µjk(t)Hjk(xjk(t))Gjk(xjk(t)), (3.4)
where Hjk(xjk) specifies the rejected fraction of the outbound traffic µjkGjk(xjk(t)),
0 ≤ Hjk(xjk(t)) ≤ 1. The traffic from Nj to Nk
λcjk(t) = µjk(t){1−Hjk(xjk(t))}Gjk(xjk(t)) ≡ µjk(t)Gˆjk(xjk(t)). (3.5)
For a real system, Gjk(xjk) must be positive, moreover, Gjk(xjk) and Hjk(xjk)
are defined for xjk ≥ 0. Therefore, Gˆjk(xjk) ≡ [1 − Hjk(xjk)]Gjk(xjk) is positive
also. In subsequent discussions, we assume that
∂Gˆjk
∂xjk
(This is reasonable, because
outgoing traffic increases with buffer occupancy, and vice versa) and Gˆjk(xjk) can be
differentiated twice with respect to xjk. Given that
λinjk(t) = αjk(t)λj(t), (3.6)
where αjk(t) denotes the portion of the total traffic λj(t) entering Nj, which is routed
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to Nk. So the following relations hold for Lj,k, ∀j, k,
x˙jk = −µjkGjk(xjk) + αjk[ϕjrj +
∑
i
ξijµijGˆij(xij)], (3.7)
where
0 < αjk(t) ≤ 1,
0 ≤ ϕj(t) ≤ 1,
0 ≤ ξij(t) ≤ 1,∑
k αjk(t) = 1.
(3.8)
The physical meaning of the above constraints is obvious and is reasonable. For packet
throttling, ϕj and ξij are the natural choices of control variables. When ϕj = 1 and
0, respectively, it means that all of input traffic, rj(t), is accepted and rejected. A
similar argument applies to ξij. If ϕj (Nj ∈ N) and ξij (Li,j ∈ L) are all used as
control variables, it means that the entire cluster is fully controlled. If we just use ϕj
(Nj ∈ N) as control variables, it is the case of “edge control” which means we just
throttle the traffic entering the network.
C. Backward Propagation Feedback Control
In this section, we discuss the intra-cluster, rate-based and queue-based backward
propagation feedback control algorithms using sliding mode control. We assume that
the time difference between nodes in the same cluster is negligible, and the packet
rate information of nodes in a cluster can be obtained and exchanged at reasonable
costs. For the rate-based solution, the primary control and measurement parameter
is the flow rate of a particular link. For the queue-based solution, we use the queue
length/occupancy of a buffer as the performance indicator. We found that the relative
degree of the rate-based approach is one, so we need not use the derivative of the
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packet flow rate for the control algorithm. On the other hand, the relative degree of
the queue-based scheme is two, implying that we do need to obtain the first derivative
of the queue length measurement for the flow control algorithm. Intuitively, the first
approach is more suitable for low traffic intensity situations, because of the lower
levels of packet queuing. The second approach, on the other hand, is more suitable
for high intensity attacks, because packet queue lengths become very good indicators
of the congestion/traffic level.
It is relatively simple for a DDoS victim to detect the presence of the attack:
many of regular users cannot access the service, and/or their productivity measures
drop abruptly. It is much more difficult, sometimes impossible, to trace the exact
routes of attacks, especially when the attacker is able to change the attack patterns.
Obviously, the effectiveness of the defense is proportional to the number of routing
devices on the affected hot paths that participate in the defense. We note that a
routing device may not have full knowledge of the hot and cold streams that pass
through it. Under such a condition, it is not possible to have perfect control of
the backward pressure propagation, but rather, we will need to rely on a search
approach to identify the attacking paths and apply the greatest backward pressure to
the strongest attack sources. One can achieve this objective by combining a classical
depth-first or breadth first search algorithm, and a two way handshaking process
between a routing device and the victim. Here, we focus on the traffic stability of
the on-off control algorithm to avoid oscillation of traffic in both the victim and the
related network resources.
The sliding mode, on-off control scheme is very simple and inexpensive. The
feedback controller defines a switch function s, which is a function of the outputs
(rates, queue length, etc.) and possibly their derivatives of the proper relative degree.
At each control time instance, the system measures the new traffic value, possibly
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after filtering of short-term bursts, examine the required backward pressure between
nodes. The value of s changes with time, and the control objective is to force s value
toward the value of 0 at each time instance of the control action. By the on-off control
rule, in an ideal system where only on and off are permissible actions, the throttling
turns off when s < 0 (all traffic permitted), and throttling turns on when s > 0 (all
traffic blocked.) That is, on the state-space trajectory of s, the control action has a
step jump at s = 0+ and s = 0− that will lead to chattering problem. To avoid bursty
traffic, the on-off control actions can be eased by continuous smoothing. That is, we
change the control actions from a step jump to a slope function, so that throttling
levels adjust with the s values, to eliminate oscillation, see Section D for more details.
In the analysis, we assume that the bursty traffic is adequately smoothed to represent
the true demand levels.
1. Rate-Based Control Algorithm
Consider the cluster topology in Fig. 17, assuming that the hot spot N3 and the hot
packet streams have been identified. Two different types of hot packet sources are
considered: hosts and network routing devices. r1 and d1 are respectively the hot and
cold input rates from src1 to N1. r2 and d2 are defined in a similar manner. Now,
let us consider the dynamic traffic flow model of the above topology, which is derived
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Fig. 17. The flow balance diagram within a cluster.
from the basic balance equation in (3.7):

x˙12 = −µ12G12 + α12[d1 + ϕ1r1 + µ21Gˆ21 + µ31Gˆ31],
x˙13 = −µ13G13 + α13[d1 + ϕ1r1 + µ21Gˆ21 + µ31Gˆ31],
x˙21 = −µ21G21 + α21[d2 + ϕ2r2 + µ12Gˆ12 + µ32Gˆ32],
x˙23 = −µ23G23 + α23[d2 + ϕ2r2 + µ12Gˆ12 + µ32Gˆ32],
x˙31 = −µ31G31 + α31[µ13Gˆ13 + µ23Gˆ23],
x˙32 = −µ32G32 + α32[µ13Gˆ13 + µ23Gˆ23].
(3.9)
Throttling applies only to the hot packet rates, r1 and r2. This implies that for
equations (3.9), the coefficients of r1 and r2 are ϕ1 and ϕ2 respectively, but the
coefficients of d1 and d2 are one. We note that, it may be difficult to determine the
explicit forms of Gij(xij) and Hij(xij) for real systems. Here, according to equations
(3.1) and (3.5), and considering ξij = 1(the edge control case), the total input rate to
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the hot spot, N3, is
λ3 = µ13Gˆ13 + µ23Gˆ23 ≡ y. (3.10)
After some simple reorganization, we can rewrite the above equations into the follow-
ing forms, 
x˙12 = f12(x12, x21, x31) + α12d1 + α12r1ϕ1,
x˙13 = f13(x13, x21, x31) + α13d1 + α13r1ϕ1,
x˙21 = f21(x21, x12, x32) + α21d2 + α21r2ϕ2,
x˙23 = f23(x23, x12, x32) + α23d2 + α23r2ϕ2,
x˙31 = f31(x31, x13, x23),
x˙32 = f32(x32, x13, x23).
(3.11)
where
f12(x12, x21, x31) ≡ −µ12G12(x12 + α12µ21Gˆ21(x21) + α12µ31Gˆ31(x31). (3.12)
f13, f21, f23, f31 and f32 are defined similarly. The arguments of these functions will
be omitted in later discussion, whenever it is convenient and without risk of confusion.
From the viewpoint of a control system, the defense of DDoS attacks is a strongly-
coupled, nonlinear system. In addition, the system parameters, e.g. Gij(xij) and
Hij(xij), may not be easily determined in an explicit form. Our goal is to keep
the total input rate of the hot spot N3 at a desired value, yd, through real-time
adjustment of ϕ1 and ϕ2 according to current traffic conditions. Considering the fact
that y monotonically increases with ϕ1 and ϕ2, we make a reasonable assumption that
system (3.9) or (3.11) is minimum phase. Here, we can express the control objective
by the following equation.
yˆ = y − yd, (3.13)
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˙ˆy ≡ y˙
= µ13
∂Gˆ13
∂x13
x˙13 + µ23
∂Gˆ23
∂x23
x˙23
= µ13
∂Gˆ13
∂x13
(f13 + α13d1 + α13r1ϕ1)
+µ23
∂Gˆ23
∂x23
(f23 + α23d2 + α23r2ϕ2).
(3.14)
The control variables ϕ1 and ϕ2 appear in the first order derivative of yˆ, so the relative
degree is one. According to the sliding-mode control rules, one can select s = yˆ as
the threshold function (s = 0 defines the sliding manifold). Intuitively, when s > 0,
we adjust ϕ1 and ϕ2 to make s˙ < 0. On the other hand, when s < 0, we select ϕ1
and ϕ2 to satisfy s˙ > 0.
Case 1: For s > 0 or y > yd,
s˙ = ˙ˆy = y˙ < 0, (3.15)
where ˙ˆy is defined in (3.14). Given that
∂Gˆij
∂xij
, αij and µij, through some simple
algebraic manipulation we set the constraints on control variables ϕ1 and ϕ2,
ϕ1 < −f13 + α13d1α13r1 ,
ϕ2 < −f23 + α23d2α23r2 ,
(3.16)
to satisfy µ13
∂Gˆ13
∂x13
(f13+α13d1+α13r1ϕ1) < 0 and µ23
∂Gˆ23
∂x23
(f23+α23d2+α23r2ϕ2) < 0,
and thus s˙ < 0.
Case 2: For s < 0 or y < yd, we need to have
s˙ = ˙ˆy = y˙ > 0, (3.17)
Through a similar argument as in the case of s > 0, we can derive the control variables
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ϕ1 and ϕ2 such that 
ϕ1 > −f13 + α13d1α13r1 ,
ϕ2 > −f23 + α23d2α23r2 ,
(3.18)
to satisfy µ13
∂Gˆ13
∂x13
(f13+α13d1+α13r1ϕ1) > 0 and µ23
∂Gˆ23
∂x23
(f23+α23d2+α23r2ϕ2) > 0,
and thus s˙ > 0.
A main concern of the control variable setting is the system stability. If and only
if when (3.15) and (3.17) are satisfied, ss˙ < 0 holds. This means that ddts
2 < 0, and by
the Lyapunov stability law (see Appendix B), the system will converge to s = 0(y = yˆ
under the control strategy (3.15) and (3.17). Given that (3.16) and (3.18) have stricter
constraints than (3.15) and (3.17), using the control rules (3.16) and (3.18) guarantees
that s will asymptotically converge to zero, based on the Lyapunov conditions. When
combined with (3.8), the final control strategy can be rewritten as
0 ≤ ϕ1 < min{−f13 + α13d1α13r1 , 1}
0 ≤ ϕ2 < min{−f23 + α23d2α23r2 , 1}
, for s > 0, (3.19)
and 
1 ≥ ϕ1 > max{−f13 + α13d1α13r1 , 0}
0 ≥ ϕ2 > max{−f23 + α23d2α23r2 , 0}
, for s < 0, (3.20)
Note that, when s > 0, it is possible that −f13 + α13d1α13r1 < 0 or −
f23 + α23d2
α23r2 <
0, which means the cold traffic rate entering N1 or N2 is so large that the buffer
occupancy at links L1,3 or L2,3 cannot be effectively reduced even if there is no hot
packets entering N1 (ϕ1 = 0) or N2 (ϕ2 = 0). This could mean formation of a new hot
spot, or misidentification of the hot spot. To bring down the traffic level, one should
treat some portion of the cold traffic d1 and d2 the same as hot traffic, and throttle
them accordingly. Similarly, when s < 0, it is possible that −f13 + α13d1α13r1 > 1 or
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−f23 + α23d2α23r2 > 1. In this case, it implies that even if the hot traffic is not throttled
(ϕ1 = 1 or ϕ2 = 1), s˙ cannot be greater than zero, and thus is always less than zero.
Under such conditions, the total input rate to the hot spot, N3, cannot exceed the
desired value yˆ, i.e., hot traffic r1 and r2 are not “hot” anymore.
As a final note, the relative degree of this 3-node is indeed one because the
switching function turns out to be not related to any high order derivatives of the
controlled variables. If the relative degree turns out to be two, we should redefine the
switching function as s = yˆ + ω ˙ˆy(ω > 0). For a larger system analysis, such as the
inter-cluster model, it will be necessary to consider the minimum phase conditions
for (3.9) or equivalently (3.11).
2. Queue-Based Control Algorithm
Now, let us consider the cluster in Fig. 18 where N3 is the destination of DDoS
attacks, and the control objective is aimed at keeping the length of two queues in N3,
x34 and x35, at desired values xˆ34 and xˆ35, respectively. Assume that the hot packet
streams have been identified, where r1 and d1 are respectively the hot and cold input
rates from src1 to N1, and r2 and d2 are defined in a similar manner. In fact, N3 can
represent a sub-network with links L1,3, L2,3, L3,4 and L3,5 as the input and output
links to the sub-network. N3 could also represent a collection of nodes including the
hot spot and its adjacent nodes that need to be protected from the attack. The
60
1 3
2
c-src2
r1
d
1
r2
d
2
h-src2
c-src1
h-src1
4
5
subnet
Fig. 18. The queue-based congestion control model.
system equilibrium equations are
x˙12 = −µ12G12 + α12(d1 + ϕ1r1 + µ21Gˆ21),
x˙13 = −µ13G13 + α13(d1 + ϕ1r1 + µ21Gˆ21),
x˙21 = −µ21G21 + α21(d2 + ϕ2r2 + µ12Gˆ12),
x˙23 = −µ23G23 + α23(d2 + ϕ2r2 + µ12Gˆ12),
x˙34 = −µ34G34 + α34(µ13Gˆ13 + µ23Gˆ23),
x˙35 = −µ35G35 + α35(µ13Gˆ13 + µ23Gˆ23).
(3.21)
Based on this control objective, its control algorithms and system dynamics, we have
concluded that this is a 2-input-2-output control system, whose control variables are
ϕ1 and ϕ2, outputs x34 and x35, and relative degrees (2, 2). As a result, we must
use the first order derivatives of the outputs, x34 and x35, to construct the sliding
manifolds. Similar to the rate-based control system, we assume that system (3.21) is
minimum phase. Using the same Lyapunov stability law, we propose the following
61
switch functions: 
s1 = x34 + ω1x˙34 − xˆ34,
s2 = x35 + ω2x˙35 − xˆ35,
(3.22)
where xˆ34 and xˆ35 are the target queue lengths. The sliding manifolds for this queue
length control system are s1 = 0 and s2 = 0, and we select coefficients ω1 > 0 and
ω2 > 0 so that the sliding manifolds are stable. For queue length control, it is not
sufficient to make s1 = 0 and s2 = 0, since it does not guarantee that y34 = x34 − xˆ34
and y35 = x35 − xˆ35 would converge to zero. After some iterative derivations, we
propose the following switching functions,
s˙1 = x˙34 + ω1x¨34
= p1 + q11ϕ1 + q12ϕ2,
(3.23)
where the intermediate variables p1, q11 and q12 are defined as follows.
p1 ≡ (1− ω1µ34∂G34∂x34 )x˙34
+ω1α34µ13
∂G13
∂x13
[−µ13G13 + α13(d1 + µ21Gˆ21)]
+ω1α34µ23
∂G23
∂x23
[−µ23G23 + α23(d2 + µ12Gˆ12)],
(3.24)
q11 ≡ ω1α34µ13∂G13
∂x13
α13r1, (3.25)
q12 ≡ ω1α34µ23∂G23
∂x23
α23r2. (3.26)
Similarly,
s˙2 = x˙35 + ω2x¨35 = p2 + q21ϕ1 + q22ϕ2, (3.27)
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where
p2 ≡ (1− ω2µ35∂G35∂x35 )x˙35
+ω2α35µ13
∂G13
∂x13
[−µ13G13 + α13(d1 + µ21Gˆ21)]
+ω2α35µ23
∂G23
∂x23
[−µ23G23 + α23(d2 + µ12Gˆ12)],
(3.28)
q21 ≡ ω2α35µ13∂G13
∂x13
α13r1, (3.29)
q22 ≡ ω2α35µ23∂G23
∂x23
α23r2. (3.30)
The control method is to adjust the values of ϕ1 and ϕ2 so that sis˙i < 0 (for i = 1, 2).
To simplify the derivation, we define the following notation
li =

l+i , l
+
i + pi > 0, when si < 0,
l−i , l
−
i + pi < 0, when si > 0,
(3.31)
for i = 1, 2.
We need to derive pi and qij from on-line performance measures, which may not
be readily available. To overcome this problem, we instead derive in (3.31) the range
of l+i and l
−
i , so that they can be used in the following equation to set the bounds of
control changes. That is, the control law becomes
 ϕ1
ϕ2
 =
 q11 q12
q21 q22

−1  l1
l2
 . (3.32)
Obviously, sis˙i < 0 holds for i = 1, 2. In fact, when si < 0, we have s˙i = l
+
i + pi > 0,
and when si > 0, we have s˙i = l
−
i + pi > 0. These control laws guarantee that
the system states converge to si = 0(i = 1, 2), based on the Lyapunov stability law.
Because the sliding manifolds si = 0(i = 1, 2) are stable (we select manually ω1 > 0
and ω2 > 0, x34 will converge to xˆ34 and x35 to xˆ35 under the above control law. Note
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that it is necessary for the dynamic system (3.21) to be minimum phase to guarantee
the system stability under the control law (3.22).
Chattering increases with system delays, because switching will not take place
exactly on the switch surface. Significant chattering will cause the oscillation of
the network traffic, making it a major hurdle to advancement of quality-guaranteed
data networks. Continuous approximation [3] is a technique widely used to reduce
chattering. The main idea of this technique is to replace abrupt control variable
adjustment by slopes, or other similar functions, so that the chattering effects on
the state space can be reduced. A main challenge is to make sure that the state
trajectory follows the switch manifold as close as possible, with minimal chattering
effects. Assume that it is difficult to measure system parameters precisely, and based
on the continuous approximation method [3], we simplify the strategy (3.19) (3.20)
as (shown in Fig. 19)
ϕ1 =

−k1s+ ν1, |s| ≤ δ1,
1, s < −δ1,
0, s > δ1,
(3.33)
and
ϕ2 =

−k2s+ ν2, |s| ≤ δ2,
1, s < −δ2,
0, s > δ2,
(3.34)
where k1, k2 > 0.
D. Implementation and Simulation
Our scheme can be readily implemented on existing routing devices without chang-
ing their communication protocols. We will focus on the ATM implementation here,
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Fig. 19. A smooth, simplified control strategy to reduce chattering.
because of its popularity in wide area networks. ATM supports priority transmis-
sion. During normal operations, an ATM switch (may) block inflow of new packets
with lower priorities, when it decides that its buffer would be full “soon”. For back-
ward pressure propagation control, a single backward pressure bit is needed for each
channel. When this BP bit is set for the channel, all activities in the switch for cell
transport of the channels are subject to the DDoS control rules that are set by the
upper layer algorithms. One must have proper measures to guarantee that DDoS
control packets can pass through clogged routing devices for execution of flow control
decisions. This implies that the priority setting of internal control signals for channel
arbitration will also need to be adjusted, in order to enforce preemption rules between
channels. This feature is particularly important to counter DDoS attacks that are
aimed at saturating the entire transport channels.
For rate enforcement, the leaky bucket algorithm can be readily applied. Here,
CBR and VBR connections can be policed for Peak Cell Rate using one and two
buckets, respectively. Each of the connections can be guaranteed to be within three
percent of granularity for bandwidth allocation, ranging from 64Kbps to 622Mbps in
commercial products. ATM uses the RM cell to carry information such as Explicit
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Cell Rate, Current Cell Rate, Queue Length for flow control. A leaky bucket is mainly
controlled by three parameters: 1) splash, the amount of fluid added to the bucket
when a cell is taken into the network, 2) leak, the leak rate of the bucket, and 3) Blimit,
the maximum bucket size. A typical leaky bucket algorithm can be summarized as
follows, where “BLevel” stands for “Bucket Level” and “MOLT” stands for “Moment
Of Last Transfer”.
/* Calculate actual Bucket Level*/
NewBLevel := BLevel - (SCount - MOLT) * Leak + Splash
/* Bucket is empty if calculated level is < 0 */
if NewBLevel < 0 then NewBLevel := 0
/* Decide contract conformance */
if NewBLevel < BLimit then
Decision := Conforming
else
Decision := Non-Conforming
endif
/* Update BLevel and MOLT */
if Decision = Conforming then
Blevel := NewBLevel
MOLT := SCount
endif
DDoS defense can be modeled as a special case of the regular traffic policing
problems in ATM transport (see Fig. 20). For normal operations, the traffic flow is
examined for its conformance to the traffic contract, at arrival of each cell. The leaky
bucket can be viewed as a virtual scheduler with continuous states, because it needs
to be shared among different connections, and for its fine granularity in rate control.
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Fig. 20. Dual leaky bucket scheme for PCR and SCR conformation.
The leaky bucket needs to control the sustained constant rates (SCR) and the Burst
Tolerance (BT). BT can be derived from SCR, peak constant rate (PCR), or other
measures. When continuous smoothing is needed, one can easily use a counter to keep
track of the incremental that the leaky bucket must take to adjust the permissible
flow rate at each control instance. Control actions for DDoS defense can be readily
accommodated by Usage Parameter Control (UPC) which is usually defined as the
set of actions taken by the network to monitor traffic and enforce the traffic contract.
The leaky bucket can either drop or tag offending cells of contract violators and DDoS
offenders.
The total logic gate count to implement the leaky bucket, and the control block
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for update rate control parameter is estimated at less than 100k, or roughly about
one mm2 of the silicon area using the contemporary 0.15µ CMOS technology. Control
parameter memory stores the rate control parameters such as: leak, splash, and bucket
limit for each flow. A total of 32 bits are needed for the rate control parameter entry
to adjust the flow rate ranging from 2.5Gbps to 64Kbps. Each flow also has 32 sliding
window that is controlled by the update rate control parameter block. If 32k × 32bit
SRAM is implemented as on chip memory, the silicon area is estimated at 10mm2
in 0.15µ CMOS. This represents insignificant amount of VLSI area for most router
design.
We evaluate the proposed algorithms using time driven simulations. Three inter-
connected nodes in a cluster work together to defend the flood of packets caused by a
DDoS attack that attacked node 3. The total hot packet rate exceeds 1, the average
cold packet rate is equal to 0.2, and the control interval is set at 10 clock cycles. The
total buffer size is set at 60, and the target (average) queue length is set at 20, and the
switching function s is defined using the queue-based algorithm, based on the queue
length and its first derivative. Referring to Fig. 21 and Fig. 22, we compare the
queue length between non-smoothing and smoothing control approaches. Referring
to Fig. 23 and Fig. 24, we compare the switching function and throttling level be-
tween non-smoothing and smoothing control approaches. In Fig. 25 and Fig. 26, we
compare the throughput between non-smoothing and smoothing control approaches.
Before DDoS was engaged, we can see that the queues in the three nodes steadily
grew until they became full. Then, when the DDoS defense kicked in, at clock time =
500, the queue length at node 3 steadily declined until it reached the approximated
target queue length. Both nodes 1 and 2 did not have buildup, because the inflow
control has been backward propagated to their inputs, according to the control rules.
In this case, the queue length is also averaged for every ten cycles for readability. The
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Fig. 21. Queue length with the non-smoothed control rule.
next issue of interest is the switching behavior. One can see that the values of the
non-smoothed switching clearly oscillated much more than the smoothed one, and
the throttling actions were much more bursty than its smoothed counterpart (at the
right hand side column). Finally, let us examine the performance of the cold packet
streams. In both cases, the cold packet streams were affected, because of the powerful
hot packet storms. The cold packet streams have similar throughput levels, but the
smoothed control scheme produced less bursty fluctuation, for obvious reasons.
E. Conclusion
This chapter gives a comprehensive treatment of the complex system dynamics related
to DDoS defense, based on two different performance metrics, and control algorithms.
We believe that the algorithms can be implemented in VLSI with negligible overheads,
and no significant protocol change is necessary. Filtering techniques that can deter-
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Fig. 22. Queue length with the smoothed control rule.
Fig. 23. Switching function and throttling level with the non-smoothed control rule.
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Fig. 24. Switching function and throttling level with the smoothed control rule.
Fig. 25. Throughput with the non-smoothed control rule.
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Fig. 26. Throughput with the smoothed control rule.
mine the predominating delay properties of a target network will be critical to the
design of effective control algorithms. Primary factors related to oscillation include
the time delay, (in)accurate representation of relative degree, noise (short bursts,) and
characteristics (relative degree, minimal phase, etc.) of the network under control.
Many existing flow control protocols are essentially some variations of the on-off con-
trol strategies without proper consideration of the relative degree they are susceptible
to instability and breakdown.
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CHAPTER IV
ANTI-EAVESDROPPING GROUP COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS
In this chapter, we propose broadcast protocols and flow control algorithms to resist
eavesdropping and traffic profiling of group communications. We adopt secret-sharing
approach for exchange of shared key so that group members can use digital signatures
to identify specific secret-sharing rule and determine their session keys independently.
After the initiation phase to establish group memberships and exchange shared keys,
group members exchange messages after they are fragmented, shuﬄed and encrypted
into multicast packets. These packets are delivered along different paths to produce
a concealment effect similar to that of the DC-net.
We consider breadth- and depth-first based packet delivery schemes. In the
breadth-first scheme, packets are relayed in two stages across group members. For
the depth-first approach, group members are organized into rings, each of which can
be responsible for delivery of a particular type of packets. To resist traffic pattern
profiling attacks, we develop a window-based adaptive traffic padding scheme for
group members to balance their traffic flows. Both simulation and empirical results
show that our scheme is highly efficient and robust to different traffic conditions. It
has been tested on a highly secure network appliance machine to demonstrate its
feasibility.
A. Introduction
Cryptographic protection can hide the contents of messages from unauthorized per-
sons, but an eavesdropper can still eavesdrop the traffic pattern, without explicitly
cracking encrypted messages, to extract some useful information, e.g. communication
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peak times, sender-recipient pairs [67][68]. Such information can be critical for some
applications, e.g. online bank transactions, battle field communication, etc. Traf-
fic pattern concealment is an effective way to protect the traffic flow confidentiality
[69][70][71][72]. In this chapter, we investigate sender-recipient anonymity in overlay
group communications. Our ultimate goal is to hide the communication initiator
among all group members so that only group members can determine the message
senders.
A basic technique to counter traffic analysis attacks is traffic padding [69][70][71][72]:
adding decoy/dummy packets to the traffic, so that the padded traffic pattern is made
unrelated to the payload traffic. Raymond in [67] gives a survey on possible traffic
analysis attacks on systems providing anonymous services and possible solutions.
Baran [70] suggests using dummy or fraudulent traffic between fictitious users of the
system to conceal traffic loading.
In [69] Chaum proposed a technique, in which users always deliver message
through a proxy, called mix. The mix first collects a predefined number of fixed-
size message packets from different users, and then shuﬄes the order of those packets
and sends them out. In such a way, the sender identity is hidden among the user set.
Considering that a mix cannot always get the predefined number of packets from the
users, Chaum also suggests using dummy messages. In [73], Syverson etc. suggests
using constant inter-arrival time (CIT) padding between the user and the proxy. CIT
padding is also used in [67] to prevent packet counting attacks.
Knowing that dummy packets consume network bandwidth, it is highly desir-
able to use the minimal amounts of dummy packets to achieve concealment of the
traffic patterns. In [71], Venkatraman and Newman-Wolfe proposed a linear program-
ming method to optimize the bandwidth utilization while preventing traffic analysis.
However, this optimization discloses the overall traffic and makes the system insecure.
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Making the security mechanisms adaptive to the network conditions can reduce
the performance costs, but the resulting traffic profile still needs to be made immune
to statistical traffic analysis. In [74], Timmerman proposed an adaptive scheme for
packet padding and rate control to reduce costs of traffic masking when the traffic
workload changes. However, since dummy traffic rates are adjusted in (reverse) pro-
portion to the real traffic, an adversary can deduce the real traffic loading through
observing the padded traffic rate.
In this chapter, we propose a new technique for protection of group communica-
tions by concealment of sender-recipient pairs, and their traffic patterns. We assume
that an existing key management scheme can be adopted for distribution and control
of shared keys/secrets for secure data transport, and we focus on the sender-recipient
anonymity, packet routing and adaptive traffic padding for a “well-known” group.
Our basic approach is to fragment and disperse encrypted messages into multicast
packets to be transported along different paths, creating an effect similar to that of the
DC-net [75] so that the adversary cannot efficiently determine the source/recipient
of a message without correct ordering of all packets, in addition to the needs for
deciphering the messages. Packet flows among nodes are made balanced, to elimi-
nate traffic patterns related to group activities. We proposed a distributed sliding
window-based adaptive traffic padding scheme to control transmission of payload and
dummy packets. In this scheme, we adjust the padded traffic rate instead of the decoy
traffic rate to adapt to the changing of available network bandwidth. We proved that
under this scheme, the padded traffic rate converges to the available bandwidth of
the bottleneck link independent of the round trip time of the ring, and the feedback
information does not disclose any information of sender/recipient activity. This is
particularly important for an open network environment, where the users may not
have full control of the network resources.
75
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section B describes the
design of our anti-eavesdropping broadcast (AEB) protocol. Section C extends the
design to provide adaptive traffic padding to improve bandwidth utilization. Section
D and E provides a detailed performance evaluation and comparison. We conclude
the chapter in Section F.
B. Anti-Eavesdropping Broadcasting (AEB) Protocols
In this section, we discuss our anti-eavesdropping broadcast (AEB) protocol to sup-
port dispersed transport of fragmented messages (after they are encrypted if nec-
essary). AEB consists of two phases: initialization and operation. They exchange
credentials and group keys before data exchange starts. When a legitimate new mem-
ber needs to join the group, existing members must give it group keys to participate
in group activities. When an active member departs, all the group keys of the group
need be discarded, and the remaining members need to re-generate their group keys.
1. Design Goals
To provide sender-recipient traffic pattern anonymity for group communications, our
work distinguishes itself from previous solutions, e.g. [75] by balancing of performance
and anonymity requirements in an open networking environment. We assume that
a public key infrastructure (PKI), e.g. X.509 or PGP, provides trust management
and authentication, but the authentication authority does not necessarily possess the
secrets for protected data exchanges. For group key distribution, we assume the use
of a secret sharing scheme like that of Shamir [76] and Blakley [77], so that a recipient
can recover the message when k-out-of-n of the shares or shadows become available.
Of course, other authentication techniques like those in [78][79][80][81][82][83] are also
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applicable. Nodes in the group but not involved in a transport session will only relay
packets without deciphering the contents. We use a simple secret sharing based group
key generation scheme, which was proposed in [76].
Given that the authentication and encryption issues are addressed, we next con-
sider two issues related to sender-recipient anonymity: packet address headers, and
packet transport patterns. It is impossible to conceal the existence of a “well known”
group. However, it is relatively simple to use alias group ID headers to protect the real
identities of group members. To prevent statistical analysis of the sender-recipient
patterns, next we propose a dispersed packet transport scheme to conceal the group
member interactions.
2. Dispersed Packet Transport
Group communication patterns can be divided into four major types: point-to-point
(1− 1), point-to-multipoint (1−N), multi-point-to-point (N − 1) and multipoint-to-
multipoint broadcast (N −N). To disassociate traffic patterns from group activities,
the first obvious step is to use one single packet format to serve all types of data
transport. To conceal the traffic pattern between a sender-recipient pair, their data
exchange can be broken into fragments, each of which is diverted to one or more inter-
mediate nodes before being delivered to the real destination. With sufficient amounts
of fragments being emitted by group members one can generate highly symmetric
packet flows, with help of padding traffic, which makes it very difficult to identify
the sender-recipient pairs, not to mention how to decipher their messages. Packet
fragmentation and shuﬄing is simple and efficient. Fig. 27 depicts the shuﬄing rule
(3142) for mapping of message M. Let the shuﬄing outputs be denoted as V, we send
packets in set Vi, for example, V1 contains packets M33, M31, M34 and M32, to node
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Fig. 27. An example on the double shuﬄing and slicing of packets (p = 4).
Ai respectively (i = 1, 2, · · · , n). When a node S needs to broadcast a message M to
n nodes, A = {A1, A2, · · · , An} in the group, S first sends out the digital signature
of a secret-sharing rule so that only nodes in A can determine the session key. Other
shuﬄing rules can be made a part of the shared key distribution system, so that only
the chosen group members can decipher the shuﬄed messages.
3. Pattern-Free Packet Flows
Fragmented messages can be transmitted by breadth- and depth-first multicasts to
create pattern-free packet flows. The multicast packets are routed via multiple nodes,
but only nodes that have the proper session keys can decode the packets. In the
breadth-first scheme, the sender fragments and disperses pieces of the message to
intermediate nodes, which then relay these packets to the real destination(s). For the
depth-first scheme, group nodes are organized into rings, so that data shares can be
transported along them to reach destinations.
In the breadth-first scheme, broadcast traffic for the 1 − 1 and 1 − N commu-
nications can be made symmetric by making the numbers of inbound and outbound
messages identical at all nodes. All messages intended for specific destination are
mapped into multicast packets to conceal the sender and recipient. N −1 and N −N
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are considered extension of these basic interaction patterns mentioned above. Pas-
sive eavesdroppers need to know the phase sequence, fragmentation and convergence
process to decipher messages. Suppose that there are n nodes in the group, and the
sender S uses i members for relay, the possibility of an eavesdropper knowing exactly
the i group members is (
∑n
i=1 (
n
i ))
−1 = 12n − 1. This simple equation does not consider
the protecting effects of the dummy packets, nor that of packet ordering. Details of
the breadth-first message processing routines are described below.
Node S fragments and disperses message M (through broadcast) to n partici-
pating nodes A = {A1, A2, · · · , An} (with a shared key K) and m intermediate relay
nodes. All nodes relay message fragments in turn to other nodes to reassemble in the
second phase.
Input: Message M and the shared key K.
Output: All n participating nodes with K able to decipher M .
Algorithm description at source S
o Calculate complete message encipher EK(M).
o Fragment EK(M) into p pieces, and do shuﬄing as shown in Fig. 27, F (EK(M), n,m, p) =
V1, V2, ..., Vp, where F (∗) stands for fragmentation and shuﬄing operation.
o Choose an arbitrary next node Aj and choose a random Vi.
o Reliably transmit the encrypted fragment Vi to Aj. Noted as S → Aj : Vi.
o Whenever the flow control scheme calls for sending of packets, send out the
real or decoy packets according to the schedule.
Algorithm description at receiving nodes Aj
o For each Vi received, send an acknowledgement to the sender: Aj → S :
ACK(Vi).
o For relay nodes, simply broadcast forward inbound packets, Vi or dummy pack-
ets to its real recipient.
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Fig. 28. Illustration of depth-first permutation ring.
o For the recipient, if the number of fragments received matches the predeter-
mined size (as distributed by original source), an attempt is made to reorder and
decrypt the fragments using the shared group key: DK(V1 + V2 + · · ·+ Vp).
The basic idea of the depth-first scheme is to organize group members into mul-
tiple overlay rings, along which packets carrying message fragments can be multicast
or broadcast. In the example depicted in Fig. 28, node S intends to send a message
to A3. The message is broken into four fragments M1, M2, M3, and M4. The four
encrypted fragments can be sent along four different overlay rings to reach A3. It
is easy to show that all the 1 − 1, 1 − N , N − 1 and N − N interactions can be
implemented using the overlay rings.
Labelling of the overlay rings among a group of nodes is equivalent to the per-
mutation problem. That is, taking an arbitrary node as the starting point of node
traversing, each overlay ring represents a unique permutation of the native node la-
bels, and thus a unique ring ID. As a result, we adopt the notation of permutation
for ring representation, called a permutation ring, which represents a logical inter-
connection path between group members. When S needs to send a message to node
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Ai, it transmits each of the message fragments in a packet, along a specifically cho-
sen ring to reach Ai. The number of rings increases at a factorial order resulting
in a large search space for the eavesdroppers to crack the packets. Details of the
depth-first message processing routines are described below.
Sender S disperses the packets carrying fragmented message pieces along chosen
rings to reach nodes A = A1, A2, · · · , An through m intermediate nodes.
Input: Message M that the source wants to send, and a shared group key K.
Output: All n participating nodes with K able to decipher original message M .
Algorithm description at source S
o Calculate complete message encipher EK(M).
o Fragment the enciphered message EK(M) into p pieces, and do shuﬄing as
shown in Fig. 27, F (EK(M), n,m, p) = V1, V2, · · · , Vp, where F (∗) stands for frag-
mentation and shuﬄing operation.
o Choose a permutation pattern Πj = pij,1, pij,2, · · · , pij,n for Vj,∀j. Calculate a
ring identifier digest that uniquely identifies the hop sequence Rj = HR(Πj), ∀j.
o S → A(pij, 1) : Rj + Vj, j = 1, 2, · · · , n. S reliably unicasts Vj along j.
o S receives Vj from the last hop of j, acknowledging the successful circulation
for Vj transmitted across j.
o Send out dummy packets along different rings in accordance to the flow control
scheme.
Algorithm description at receiving nodes Ai (with permutation ring iden-
tifier j)
o Use the ring digest Rj of the received packet to calculate the next hop on j.
o Unicast the packetRj+Vi to the next hop entry A(pij, i+1) : A(pij, i)A(pij, i+1) :
Rj + Vj.
o For a recipient in A, order and decrypt the fragments using the shared group
81
key: DK(V1 + V2 + · · ·+ Vn) using the shared group key K.
Permutation rings have relatively higher latency costs because each packet needs
to traverse a ring before it is removed from the network. But it has similar buffer and
ordering overheads for the sender and recipients. Rings have simpler error recovery
and flow control schemes to conceal the communicating parties. An adversary needs
to know the rings and sequences of packet transmissions. Without having knowledge
of the nodes and the rings involved, the eavesdropper search complexity grows at
a factorial order. Taking the message-ordering complexity into consideration, the
overall probability of message cracking becomes 1
p![(n− 1)!]p .
C. Adaptive Packet Padding
In last section we discuss how to disguise group interactions via dispersed relay of
packets. In this section, we further discuss techniques on how to conceal the traffic
volumes, transmission rates, and their relationship with group activities. Packet
padding is effective in concealing payload traffic patterns. One can easily create
pattern-free (or more precisely, uni-pattern) traffic profile on a data link by using
a polling technique, in which packets are transmitted at constant time intervals.
Otherwise, it is easy to identify the sender-receiver pair by comparing their inbound
and outbound rates. Even if all packets traverse the whole ring, without traffic
padding, the outbound traffic of a source node has a large phase lag with respect
to its inbound traffic. However, simple traffic padding, e.g. fully utilizing the link
capacity, can be cost-prohibitive, due to excessive waste of bandwidth.
The objective of packet padding is to drive nodes on an overlay ring to reach
the same traffic sending rate, so that their transmission patterns would appear to
be (nearly) identical to adversaries. Equalizing the outbound rate with the inbound
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rate is effective but not sufficient, because it cannot effectively handle the condition
when the inbound traffic rate is higher than the available bandwidth of the outbound
link. For group members on a ring to match each other’s transmission rate, it is
obvious that the link that has the smallest available bandwidth will determine the
overall transmission rate on the ring. Sending rates of other group members should
be adjusted to match the available bandwidth of the bottleneck link.
1. Distributed Sliding-Window for Packet Padding
To minimize bandwidth loss, and to balance the traffic flows between group members,
we propose a distributed sliding-window-based packet padding scheme for nodes on
the overlay ring. Our scheme does not require explicit coordination messages be-
tween group members. Theoretical models and simulations show that this scheme is
adaptive to bandwidth variation, and greatly reduces the bandwidth waste, without
compromising concealment of the traffic patterns.
The sliding-window based flow control protocol is successfully deployed to the
TCP protocols [21]. A TCP sender maintains a congestion window, whose size defines
the largest number of outstanding packets that are allowed to be in transit. From the
flow control viewpoint, a TCP session can be viewed as a logical ring. The payload
packets and ACK packets are transmitted on the forward and backward paths of
a TCP session respectively, while for an overlay ring there is no obvious difference
between forward and backward paths (see Fig. 29). A TCP session has an obvious
sender and receiver while for a ring all nodes are virtually identical.
In summary, we can view an overlay ring as one single transmission session, and
each of the intermediate overlay nodes is equivalent to an intermediate router on the
forward path. We adopt a sliding-window-based scheme to throttle the traffic on the
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overlay ring, where the congestion window of a TCP session is maintained by the
TCP sender. When every node on a ring runs the sliding-window-based flow control
rules, any local changes will lead to local flow adjustments, and such adjustments will
lead to neighboring and global adjustments, without using explicit control messages.
In this way, not only nodes keep their transmission rates identical, but also adaptive
to changes of network conditions. Next we discuss the details of our algorithm.
Let us assume that there are N group members on the overlay ring, and all nodes
have the same buffer size. Each node has a sending queue to store (local, transit
and dummy) packets ready for transmission. First, each node estimates the available
bandwidth of the bottleneck link and round trip transmit latency of the ring, denoted
as C¯i and d¯i respectively, using some method developed in existing literatures, e.g.
[84][85][86][87][88][89]. Here the bandwidth and delay estimations need not be very
accurate. Then the node sets its initial window size as
W 0i =
C¯id¯i +Q/2
N
(4.1)
where Q is the buffer size. The physical meaning of (4.1) is obvious-the optimal
number of packets along the ring is C¯id¯i +Q/2 when the desired queue length of the
bottleneck link is Q/2 (see page 412 in [90]). The inaccuracy of the initial windows
caused by the bandwidth and delay estimation errors can be corrected by window
adjustment that will be discussed in subsection 3 in section C.
Sliding window scheme for overlay rings
o When the session begins, node i sends outW 0i packets. The flow control scheme
determines when to send out the next packet.
o When a node receives a packet m, it
1. increases its window size by one;
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2. checks the packet header to find whether this packet is a decoy packet.
If so, ignore it.
3. checks the packet header to find whether this packet is sent by itself
earlier. If so, ignore it.
4. If m is not sent by itself earlier and m is not a decoy packet, then put
packet m at the end of the sending queue.
o Only when the window size is larger than zero, the node can send out a packet.
o When sending a packet, the node sends a decoy packet to the next node if its
sending queue is empty; else fetch one packet from the head of sending queue and
send it to the next node.
o When an upper layer application sends a packet, the node puts the packet at
the end of the sending queue.
This sliding window scheme is static because the number of packets in the pipeline
is fixed. The window is different from the congestion window in TCP. In TCP, the
congestion window size determines the maximum outstanding packet number, while
here the window size defines the number of packets the node can send out at current
time. Moreover, in TCP, congestion window is maintained in the TCP sender. In an
overlay ring, there is no obvious sender. The window is distributed in all ring nodes.
Next we analyze its adaptability.
2. Adaptability Analysis
An important property of the sliding window flow control protocol is self-clocking–
For a connection in equilibrium, a new packet is not put into the network until an
old packet leaves [21]. Packets circulating around the ring have the same round-
trip/circulation time, R. Within the time period of R, nodes on the ring send out
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∑N
i=1W
0
i packets. Using the fluid dynamics model, the queuing dynamics for a sending
queue can be expressed as:
q˙(t) =
∑N
i=1W
0
i
R(t)
− C, (4.2)
where
R(t) = d+
q(t)
C
, (4.3)
where d is the real round trip transmit latency of the ring, q(t) is the queue length
of the congested link at time t, and q˙ the first time derivative of q. The equilibrium
state of (4.2) is
q∗ =
N∑
i=1
W 0i − Cd. (4.4)
If the bandwidth and delay estimations are accurate, that is C¯i = C and d¯i = d, (4.4)
means q∗ = Q/2.
By choosing the Lyapunov function
v =
1
2
q˙2, (4.5)
we have
v˙ = q˙q¨ = −q˙C(C¯d+Q/2)
(Cd+ q)2
q˙ < 0, (4.6)
except at q˙ = 0. Therefore, (4.2) asymptotically converges to its equilibrium point
defined by (4.4). Thus, the sending rates of all nodes converge to the congested link
capacity C. The convergence time is the round trip time R because of the self-clocking
property. Even if the congested link shifts from one to another link, the sending rates
of all nodes will converge to the new congested link capacity. ns-2 simulation results
given in section E support this statement.
We further note that the equilibrium point of the queuing dynamics is defined by
(4.2) only if 0 ≤ ∑Ni=1W 0i −Cd ≤ Q. If ∑Ni=1W 0i −Cd < 0, queue starvation (low link
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utilization) will occur. On the other hand, when
∑N
i=1W
0
i −Cd > Q, queue overflow
(packet dropping) will occur. That is, window sizes should be adjusted according to
the available bandwidth, which fluctuates with external traffic.
3. Window Adjustment
The objective of window adjustment is to keep the queue length of the bottleneck
link within a reasonable range, so that the traffic flows on all nodes of the overlay
ring can remain stable and balanced. We first study the queuing dynamics of a ring
with sliding window-based flow control scheme. Within one control period ∆t, node
i gets mi packets and increases its window size by ∆Wi(positive or negative), so that
it sends out mi +∆Wi new packets within time period ∆t. Thus, we have
∆q(t) =
N∑
i=1
[mi(t− τFi) + ∆Wi(t− τFi)]− C∆t, (4.7)
where τFi is the forward transmission delay from node i to the bottleneck link, and
N is the node number of the ring. By the self-clocking property we have
mi(t) = C∆t, (4.8)
where τBi is the transmission delay from the bottleneck link to node i. Note that
τBi + τFi = R, where R is the round trip time of the ring and R changes with time.
Substituting (4.10) into (4.9), we get
∆q(t) =
N∑
i=1
∆Wi(t− τFi), (4.9)
We choose the control period ∆t = R and adopt the following proportional feedback
control rule,
∆Wi(t) =
k
N
[qd − q(t− τBi)], (4.10)
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where 0 < k < 1. k is often set as 0.5 in order to balance the stability robustness
and convergence rate. Under this control law, the closed loop system dynamics can
be written as
q(t)− q(t−R) = k[qd − q(t−R)]. (4.11)
From (4.11), we have
q(t)− qd = (1− k)[q(t−R)− qd]. (4.12)
It is obvious that q(t) asymptotically converges to qd because 0 < k − 1 < 1. This
means that our window adjustment scheme is asymptotically stable even with large,
time-variant delays, even when the round trip time R changes with time. The queuing
dynamics under the control law (4.12) is stable.
D. Evaluation
We evaluated our models and algorithms based on simulations and implementations.
For implementation, we tested the feasibility of fragmented packet transport on top
of existing IP protocols. For simulations, we examined the robustness of the proposed
bandwidth control schemes.
1. Implementation
We used four interconnected machines on a LAN to test the feasibility of proposed
scheme using the UDP protocol. Due to resource constraints, we only tested the
depth-first scheme. Here, group members on the overlay ring exchange data using
UDP packets, while the inter-node packet transmissions are controlled by a sliding-
window-based control algorithm in each node. Real and decoy packets shared the
transmission bandwidths.
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The prototype AEB was implemented based on the total ordering algorithm pro-
posed in Isis’s ABCAST [91]. That is, if a node delivers message m before it delivers
n, then any other correct process that delivers n will deliver m before n. We em-
bedded the totally ordered ring protocol into the Emcast toolkit [92]. It includes the
program “emcast”, a generic multicast utility (like netcat), and the library “libem-
cast”, a generic multicast library. Emcast supports IPv4 multicast (IM) and end-host
multicast (EM) protocols, such as STAR (centralized TCP), Banana Tree Protocol
(BTP), and Internet Chat Relay (IRC), plus our Ring protocol. In the experiment,
only one node (Node 1) broadcasts messages and the other nodes receive messages.
In the four charts of Fig. 30, one can see that the traffic of each node remains virtu-
ally identical. The real traffic pattern reaches uniform and symmetric in each node
through AEB.
E. Simulation
It was much more complicated to test the control strategies on the prototypes. As an
alternative, we used the ns2 network simulator [93] to evaluate our adaptive packet
padding scheme. In the simulation, six nodes are interconnected to form an overlay
ring, and the link between nodes 2 and 3, and the link between nodes 4 and 5 are
shared by outside nodes, see Fig. 31. Starting from node 1, and in the ascending
order of the links between nodes, the bandwidths of links are 5, 4, 10, 5, 10, and
10 Mbs. In all following experiments, the packet sizes were set at 1k bytes, and the
window sizes were initialized as 10 pkts. The latencies of the links were set at 10 ms
unless explicitly stated. We used the following term, “linkjk” means the link between
node j and k. We call the transmission session among group members on the ring the
internal session, and the transmission sessions among non-group members the exter-
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Fig. 30. Traffic volume statistics at each node.
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nal sessions. In the simulation, we created an application-level transport protocol on
the top of UDP. When the overlay ring runs on a closed environment, without the
interference of external traffic, our sliding window control scheme converged rapidly
and remains steady henceforth. To further test the robustness and adaptability of our
scheme against uncontrolled external traffic, we created two different traffic scenarios
to examine their impact on the traffic profiles on the ring.
1. Experiment 1: Workload pattern concealment
In the first experiment, we tested the effects of workload traffic changes on the overall
(padded) traffic rate. We assume there is no eternal session in this experiment, so
that effects of workload changes can be best observed. Between the 2nd and 10th
second, there is 8Kbps workload traffic from node 1 to node 4, and between the 7th
and 17th second, there is workload traffic with rate 8Kbps from node 3 to node 5.
Fig. 32 shows the measured workload traffic rate, decoy traffic rate and padded
traffic rate on each link. It shows that the decoy traffic rates are automatically ad-
justed to make the overall padded traffic rates match the lowest available bandwidth
on the ring, 4Mbps. It clearly suggests that the workload traffic changing have vir-
tually no effects on the overall padded traffic rates.
2. Experiment 2: Performance of the static sliding window scheme
The second test was meant for simulation of static (non-adaptive) sliding window
scheme. The two external sessions, sessions 1 and 2, were created to simulate a
constant bit-rate (CBR) session. For the CBR transport, the time interval of packet
transport is set at 0.006s. At time 0 (sec), the group session starts. Then, at time
epochs 4 and 8 secs, the external session 2 between nodes 9-10, and the external session
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Fig. 32. Traffic rates on each link in experiment 1.
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Fig. 33. Congestion queue dynamics in experiment 2.
1 between nodes 7-8, started, respectively. At time epochs 12 and 16, the external
sessions 1 and 2 ended, respectively. Finally, the group internal session ended at time
epoch 20 sec. Fig. 33 shows changes of queue lengths in link23 and link45 of the ring.
The queue lengths in other nodes remained zero for the whole simulation period, so
they are not shown here. We note that even though such changes are inevitable at
presence of external sessions, it is clear that shortly after a session starts, or ends, the
queue lengths converge to their steady values rapidly. Fig. 34 plots the transmission
rates of group nodes on the ring for the experiment run. Fig. 35 shows the measured
work traffic rate on each link. In all cases, except for the short transmission rate
disturbance during state transition periods, the differences in the transmission rates
of the group members are very small, on average less than 5 percent. Note that the
disturbance to transmission rates is caused by external events, it is not associated with
the group activities.
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Fig. 34. Padded traffic rate at each link in experiment 2.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
0 5 10 15
time (sec)
w
o
rk
lo
a
d
 t
ra
ff
ic
 r
a
te
 (
M
b
p
s
)
link12
link23
link34
link45
link56
link61
Fig. 35. Workload traffic rate on each link in experiment 2 (with eternal sessions).
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Fig. 36. Padded traffic rate on each link in experiment 3.
3. Experiment 3: Performance of the adaptive sliding window scheme
The third experiment is designed to test the effectiveness of our window adjustment
scheme. All settings are the same as in experiment 2 except that our window adjust-
ment scheme is enabled. Fig. 36 shows that the overall rates at all links are almost
identical to each other. The minor rate differences are also caused by outside events,
external sessions. Fig. 37 shows that the queue length of the congested link quickly
converges to the proximity of the desired value, 20 packets, even if congestion shifts
from link23 to link45 at the 4th and 12th sec and shifts back at the 8th and 16th sec.
Thus, the link under-utilization and queue overflow are avoided.
4. Experiment 4: Performance impact of delays
The fourth experiment is used to test the effectiveness of our window adjustment
scheme for the case with large round trip delay. All settings are the same as in exper-
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Fig. 37. Queue length of each link in experiment 3.
iment 3 except that the link transmission delays for the links are set at 50ms, 50ms,
70ms, 50ms, 40ms and 70ms respectively. Thus, the round trip delay is about 0.33
seconds. Fig. 38 and Fig. 39 clearly show the effectiveness our window adjustment
scheme even with such a large round trip delay.
5. Experiment 5: Robustness of the adaptive sliding window scheme
In this experiment, we significantly increased the level of external traffic to test the
robustness of the sliding window flow control algorithm. In this case, the external
sessions recurrently start and close ever two seconds, starting from 0.5 sec. The
composite set of starts and closes of the external sessions are collectively called the
event Z in Table I.
Similar to experiment one, the transmission rates of group nodes converge to the
steady state value rapidly at absence of external sessions. Fig. 40 shows that the
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Fig. 38. Padded traffic rate on each link in experiment 4.
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Fig. 39. Queue length of each link in experiment 4.
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Fig. 41. Queue length of each link in experiment 5.
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Table I. Events in experiment 5.
Event epoch (sec) Actions
0 Internal session started
0.5 External session 2 between 7 and 8 started (event A)
1 External session 1 between 9 and 10 started (event B)
1.5 External session 1 closed (event C)
2 External session 2 closed (event D)
4.5 Composite event Z : A,B,C,D for the 2 sec duration
6.5, 8.5, · · · Z repeated every 2 seconds
20 Internal session closed
overall rates at all links are almost identical to each other. The minor rate differences
are also caused by outside events, external sessions. Obviously, the transmission
rate differences increase due to the frequent “on” and “off” of the external sessions.
Even though the transmission rates fluctuate at occurrences of new external events,
group nodes do have consistent and similar changes, making it difficult for advisory
to determine the nature of the events. Fig. 41 shows the queue length changes that
reflect arrivals and departures of external sessions, and it is noted that the queue
lengths do converge to the steady state values after each set of events.
F. Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed traffic-concealing, anti-eavesdropping communication
protocols for secure group communications. By using dispersed transport of message
fragments, we spread the interaction communication patterns among the multicast
participants to counter traffic analysis attacks. The two different types of broadcast-
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based data transport primitives have been proposed to meet different performance
and security requirements. The two-hop relay communication has less uniform traffic
pattern, but its message delivery time is shorter. On the other hand, the permutation
ring has more symmetric traffic patterns but longer latency time. Of course, to crack
the message, one still must have full knowledge about the permutation and shuﬄing
rules. It is of great interest to further expand different types of transport primitives
to conceal traffic patterns of group communications.
To resist traffic pattern profiling attacks, we develop a window-based adaptive
traffic padding scheme for group members to balance their traffic flows. Both sim-
ulation and empirical results show that our scheme is highly efficient and robust to
different traffic conditions. It has been tested on a highly secure network appliance
machine to demonstrate its feasibility.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY
The objective of this research is to develop a generic modeling and design method
of network traffic throttling. Increase and decrease (I-D) congestion control rule is
widely adopted in network traffic management because of its cost-effectiveness. I pro-
posed a modeling and design methodology for I-D congestion controllers to guarantee
asymptotic stability and eliminate traffic oscillation, based on the sliding mode control
(SMC) theory. My scheme addresses the discontinuous operations of I-D controller
that has been largely disregarded in existing literature, and shows that discontinuity
plays a crucial role in optimization of the I-D based congestion control algorithms.
Increase-Decrease control laws are very simple to implement and highly robust to pa-
rameter and model uncertainties. Their stability does not require a precise network
dynamics model.
On the basis of this sound system model, I also showed that one can design
highly effective network protection schemes against DDoS attacks, and one apply the
throttling technique to conceal the traffic patterns for protection of group communi-
cations.
DDoS management can be considered a special case of the flow control problem.
Based on the theory about modeling and management of network traffic, I developed
a backward-propagation feedback control strategy for DDoS defense. When a host
finds itself becoming a hot spot, it informs neighboring nodes and routers to reduce
influx of packets. Reduction of packet influx is propagated backward to the sources.
If a source is normal, it will reduce its sending rate when backpressure is propagated
to it. If a source ignores traffic backpressure and keeps infusing packets, it will be
identified as an attacker and its packets will be dropped by the switches or routers
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at the edge of Internet. This backward-propagation feedback control strategy adopts
a simple hop-by-hop on-off control scheme. Its design is based on well-established
sliding mode control theory. Thus, except prevent DDoS attacks, it also provides
smooth traffic and bounded queue size. Another advantage of hop-by-hop scheme is
that it responses much faster than end-to-end scheme so that delay can be ignored.
This is very important when the bandwidth-delay product becomes very large.
Private group communications are critical to protection of large scale informa-
tion systems. Standard encryption algorithms (e.g. IDEA, DES, RSA, AES, SHA1,
etc.), together with their key management systems are necessary, yet insufficient to
enable group members to conceal their interactions. In addition to cryptographic
protection of information contents, concealment of the network traffic patterns (vol-
umes, peak times, etc.) is also important to prevent unveiling the interactions be-
tween group members. A network is said to be unobservable if the volumes, times,
sender-recipient pairing and other similar measures cannot be related to the underly-
ing business activities; implying ineffectiveness of traffic analysis. Workload padding
and packet routing are basic mechanisms to counter passive traffic analysis attacks.
However, traffic masking is very expensive in terms of bandwidth consumption. The
challenge here is how to make an optimal tradeoff between traffic pattern anonymity
and network performance. Under this topic, I developed a new technique for pro-
tection of group communications by concealment of sender-recipient pairs, and their
traffic patterns. Packet flows among nodes are made balanced, to eliminate traffic
patterns related to group activities. I proposed a sliding window-based flow control
scheme to control transmission of payload and dummy packets. Our algorithms allow
flexible tradeoff between the degree of traffic uniformity, and that of the performance
costs. This is particularly important for an open network environment, where the
users may not have full control of the network resources.
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APPENDIX A
RELATIVE DEGREE AND ZERO DYNAMICS
Definition A.1 (Lie Derivative)
Given a smooth scalar function h(x) : Rn → R and a smooth vector function
f(x) = [f1(x), f2(x), · · · , fn(x)]T : Rn → Rn, where x = [x1, x2, · · · , xn]T ∈ Rn, the
Lie derivative of h(x) with respect to f(x), Lfh(x), is defined as the following scalar
function
Lfh(x) ≡ ∂h
∂x
f(x) =
n∑
i=1
∂h
∂xi
fi(x). (A.1)
We also denote
LgLfφ(x) ≡ ∂(Lfφ)
∂x
g(x), (A.2)
and
L0fφ(x) ≡ φ(x), (A.3)
Ljfφ(x) ≡ LfLj−1f φ(x). (A.4)
Definition A.2 (Relative Degree of SISO Systems)
Considering the following Single-Input-Single-Output (SISO) nonlinear system
denoted by 
x˙ = f(x) + g(x)u,
y = h(x),
(A.5)
where the state vector x = [x1, x2, · · · , xn]T ∈ Rn and the input u ∈ R, the output
y ∈ R. f(x), g(x) and h(x) are smooth functions,
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f(x) = [f1(x), f2(x), · · · , fn(x)]T : Rn → Rn,
g(x) = [g1(x), g2(x), · · · , gn(x)]T : Rn → Rn,
h(x) : Rn → R.
An SISO system described by (A.5) has a relative degree r at x0 if and only if:
(1) LgL
k
fh(x) = 0 for x in a neighborhood of x0 for ∀k < r − 1;
(2) LgL
r−1
f h(x0) 6= 0.
Definition A.3 (Relative Degree of MIMO Systems)
Consider the following Multiple-Input-Multiple-Output (MIMO) nonlinear sys-
tem denoted by 
x˙ = f(x) +G(x)u,
y = h(x),
(A.6)
where the state vector x = [x1, x2, · · · , xn]T ∈ Rn and the input vector (the control
variables) u = [u1, u2, · · · , um]T ∈ Rm, and the output vector y = [y1, y2, · · · , ym]T ∈
Rm. f(x) and h(x) are smooth function vectors. G(x) is a smooth function matrix.
f(x) = [f1(x), f2(x), · · · , fn(x)]T : Rn → Rn,
G(x) = [g1(x), g2(x), · · · , gm(x)]T ,
gi(x) = [gi,1(x), gi,2(x), · · · , gi,n(x)]T : Rn → Rn, for i = 1, 2, · · · ,m,
h = [h1(x), h2(x), · · · , hm(x)] : Rn → Rm.
An MIMO system described by (A.6) has a (vector) relative degree [r1, r2, · · · , rm] at
x0 if and only if:
(1) LgjL
k
fhi(x) = 0, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m for all x in a neighborhood of x0 for ∀k < ri−1;
(2) LgjL
ri−1
f hi(x0) 6= 0.
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APPENDIX B
STABILITY THEOREMS
Given a system described by
x˙ = f(x, t), (B.1)
where x = [x1, x2, · · · , xn]T ∈ Rn. We make a notation that x(t, x0) is a solution of
(B.1) with initial value x0 at t = 0.
Definition B.1 (Equilibrium Point)
Considering a nonlinear system (B.1), x∗ is called an equilibrium point of system
(B.1) if and only if f(x∗, t) = 0 for ∀t.
Definition B.2 (Stability)
An equilibrium point of system (B.1), is bounded stable if and only if for ∀ε > 0,
∃δ > 0, which makes ‖ x(t)− x∗ ‖< ε hold for ∀x0, which satisfies ‖ x0(t)− x∗ ‖< ε
and ∀t > 0. Further if limt→+∞ ‖ x(t)− x∗ ‖= 0 also holds on, then the equilibrium
point x∗ is asymptotically stable. We always refer to asymptotically stable unless
otherwise stated.
Definition B.3 (Positive/Negative Definite Functions)
A continuously differentiable function f : Rn → R+ is said to be positive definite
in a region U of R that contains the origin if (1) f(0) = 0 and (2) f(x) > 0 for x ∈ U
and x 6= 0. f(x) is said to be positive semidefinite if f(x) ≥ 0 for x ∈ U and x 6= 0.
Conversely, if condition (2) is replaced by f(x) < 0, then f(x) is said to be
negative definite. f(x) is said to be negative semidefinite if f(x) ≤ 0.
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Theorem B.1 (Lyapunov Stability of Autonomous Systems) Let x = 0 be an
equilibrium point for a system described by:
x˙ = f(x), (B.2)
where f : U → Rn is a continuously differentiable function and U ⊂ Rn a domain
that contains the equilibrium point of (B.2), x∗. Let V : U → R be a continuously
differentiable, positive definite function in U .
1. If V˙ (x) = ∂V∂x f(x) is negative semidefinite, then x = x
∗ is a stable equilibrium
point.
2. If V˙ (x) is negative definite, then x = x∗ is an asymptotically stable equilibrium
point.
In both cases above V is called a Lyapunov function. Moreover, if the conditions
hold for all x ∈ Rn and ‖x‖ → ∞ implies that V (x) → ∞, then x = x∗ is globally
stable in case 1 and globally asymptotically stable in case 2.
Lemma B.2 A time-invariant linear system d
ny
dtn +ωn−1
dn−1y
dtn−1
+ω1y˙+ω0y = 0, where
ωi ∈ R for i = 1, 2, · · · , n − 1, is asymptotically stable if and only if all roots of its
characteristic polynomial pn + ωn−1pn−1 + · · ·+ ω1p+ ω0 have negative real parts.
For example, y˙ + ωy = 0 is asymptotically stable if and only if ω > 0.
Theorem B.3 (Lyapunov uniform asymptotic stability of non-autonomous systems)
Let x = x∗ be an equilibrium point of a system described by (B.1) and U ⊂ Rn a do-
main containing it. Let V : U × [0,∞]→ R be a continuously differentiable function
that satisfies:
V1(x) ≤ V (x, t) ≤ V2(x) (B.3)
V˙ (x, t) =
∂V
∂t
+
∂V
∂x
f(x, t) ≤ −V3(x) (B.4)
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for all t ≥ t0, and x ∈ U , where V1(x), V2(x) and V3(x) are continuous positive
definite functions on U . Then, x = x∗ is uniformly asymptotically stable and V is
called a Lyapunov function.
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